دورية أكاديمية
Joint Operator Pricing and Network Selection Game in Cognitive Radio Networks: Equilibrium, System Dynamics and Price of Anarchy
| العنوان: | Joint Operator Pricing and Network Selection Game in Cognitive Radio Networks: Equilibrium, System Dynamics and Price of Anarchy |
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| المؤلفون: | Elias, Jocelyne, Martignon, Fabio, Chen, Lin, Altman, Eitan |
| المساهمون: | Laboratoire d'Informatique Paris Descartes (LIPADE - EA 2517), Université Paris Descartes - Paris 5 (UPD5), Laboratoire de Recherche en Informatique (LRI), Université Paris-Sud - Paris 11 (UP11)-CentraleSupélec-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS), Models for the performance analysis and the control of networks (MAESTRO), Inria Sophia Antipolis - Méditerranée (CRISAM), Institut National de Recherche en Informatique et en Automatique (Inria)-Institut National de Recherche en Informatique et en Automatique (Inria) |
| المصدر: | ISSN: 0018-9545 ; IEEE Transactions on Vehicular Technology ; https://inria.hal.science/hal-00913254Test ; IEEE Transactions on Vehicular Technology, 2013, 62 (9), pp.4576-4589. ⟨10.1109/TVT.2013.2264294⟩. |
| بيانات النشر: | HAL CCSD Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers |
| سنة النشر: | 2013 |
| مصطلحات موضوعية: | cognitive radio, game theory, pricing, Nash equilibrium, Stackelberg game, Wardrop equilibrium, anarchy price, cognitive network pricing, cognitive radio networks, joint operator pricing, network selection game, network subscription price, optimal stable price, population game model, price setting game, replicator dynamics, system dynamics, Cognitive radio networks (CRNs), network selection, [INFO.INFO-GT]Computer Science [cs]/Computer Science and Game Theory [cs.GT] |
| الوصف: | International audience ; This paper addresses the joint pricing and network selection problem in cognitive radio networks. The problem is formulated as a Stackelberg game where first the Primary and Secondary operators set the network subscription price to maximize their revenue. Then, users perform the network selection process, deciding whether to pay more for a guaranteed service, or use a cheaper, best-effort secondary network, where congestion and low throughput may be experienced. We derive optimal stable price and network selection settings. More specifically, we use the Nash equilibrium concept to characterize the equilibria for the price setting game. On the other hand, a Wardrop equilibrium is reached by users in the network selection game, since in our model a large number of users must determine individually the network they should connect to. Furthermore, we study network users' dynamics using a population game model, and we determine its convergence properties under replicator dynamics, a simple yet effective selection strategy. Numerical results demonstrate that our game model captures the main factors behind cognitive network pricing and network selection, thus representing a promising framework for the design and understanding of cognitive radio systems. |
| نوع الوثيقة: | article in journal/newspaper |
| اللغة: | English |
| العلاقة: | hal-00913254; https://inria.hal.science/hal-00913254Test; https://inria.hal.science/hal-00913254/documentTest; https://inria.hal.science/hal-00913254/file/TVT-1.pdfTest |
| DOI: | 10.1109/TVT.2013.2264294 |
| الإتاحة: | https://doi.org/10.1109/TVT.2013.2264294Test https://inria.hal.science/hal-00913254Test https://inria.hal.science/hal-00913254/documentTest https://inria.hal.science/hal-00913254/file/TVT-1.pdfTest |
| حقوق: | info:eu-repo/semantics/OpenAccess |
| رقم الانضمام: | edsbas.F04E73F0 |
| قاعدة البيانات: | BASE |
| DOI: | 10.1109/TVT.2013.2264294 |
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