تقرير
Motivated Skepticism
| العنوان: | Motivated Skepticism |
|---|---|
| المؤلفون: | Hagenbach, Jeanne, Saucet, Charlotte |
| المساهمون: | Département d'économie (Sciences Po) (ECON), Sciences Po (Sciences Po)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS), Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - École d'économie de la Sorbonne (UP1 UFR02), Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (UP1), Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne (CES), Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (UP1)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS), European Project: 850996,H2020-EU.1.1. - EXCELLENT SCIENCE - European Research Council (ERC),ERC-2019-STG,MOREV(2020) |
| المصدر: | https://hal.science/hal-03770685Test ; 2024. |
| بيانات النشر: | HAL CCSD |
| سنة النشر: | 2024 |
| المجموعة: | Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne: HAL |
| مصطلحات موضوعية: | Disclosure games, Hard information, Unraveling result, Skepticism, Motivated beliefs, Endogenous depth of reading, JEL: C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods/C.C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory/C.C7.C72 - Noncooperative Games, JEL: C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods/C.C9 - Design of Experiments/C.C9.C91 - Laboratory, Individual Behavior, JEL: D - Microeconomics/D.D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty/D.D8.D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information • Mechanism Design, JEL: D - Microeconomics/D.D9 - Intertemporal Choice/D.D9.D91 - Intertemporal Household Choice • Life Cycle Models and Saving, [SHS.ECO]Humanities and Social Sciences/Economics and Finance |
| الوصف: | We experimentally study how individuals read strategically-transmitted information when they have preferences over what they will learn. Subjects play disclosure games in which Receivers should interpret messages skeptically. We vary whether the state that Senders communicate about is ego-relevant or neutral for Receivers, and whether skeptical beliefs are aligned or not with what Receivers prefer believing. Compared to neutral settings, skepticism is significantly lower when it is self-threatening, and not enhanced when it is self-serving. These results shed light on a new channel that individuals can use to protect their beliefs in communication situations: they exercise skepticism in a motivated way, that is, in a way that depends on the desirability of the conclusions that skeptical inferences lead to. We propose two behavioral models that can generate motivated skepticism. In one model, the Receiver freely manipulates his beliefs after having made skeptical inferences. In the other, the Receiver reasons about evidence in steps and the depth of his reasoning is motivated. |
| نوع الوثيقة: | report |
| اللغة: | English |
| العلاقة: | info:eu-repo/grantAgreement//850996/EU/Motivated Reading of Evidence/MOREV; hal-03770685; https://hal.science/hal-03770685Test; https://hal.science/hal-03770685v2/documentTest; https://hal.science/hal-03770685v2/file/2024_jeanne_hagenbach_and_charlotte_saucet_motivated_skepticism.pdfTest |
| الإتاحة: | https://hal.science/hal-03770685Test https://hal.science/hal-03770685v2/documentTest https://hal.science/hal-03770685v2/file/2024_jeanne_hagenbach_and_charlotte_saucet_motivated_skepticism.pdfTest |
| حقوق: | http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-ndTest/ ; info:eu-repo/semantics/OpenAccess |
| رقم الانضمام: | edsbas.E87212B8 |
| قاعدة البيانات: | BASE |
| الوصف غير متاح. |