تقرير
Who goes first? Strategic Delay and Learning by Waiting
| العنوان: | Who goes first? Strategic Delay and Learning by Waiting |
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| المؤلفون: | Wagner, Peter |
| سنة النشر: | 2015 |
| المجموعة: | Open Access LMU (Ludwig-Maximilians-University Munich) |
| مصطلحات موضوعية: | Munich Discussion Papers in Economics, Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems, ddc:330 |
| الوصف: | This paper considers a "war of attrition" game in which agents learn about an uncertain state of the world through private signals and from their peers. I provide existence and uniqueness results for a class of equilibria that satisfy a "full-participation" condition, and show that asymmetries in the distribution of information can lead to excessive stopping and an oversupply of information relative to the social optimum. |
| نوع الوثيقة: | report |
| وصف الملف: | application/pdf |
| اللغة: | English |
| العلاقة: | Wagner, Peter (4. Mai 2015): Who goes first? Strategic Delay and Learning by Waiting. SFB/TR 15 Discussion Paper No. 500 [PDF, 330kB]; https://epub.ub.uni-muenchen.de/24764/1/500.pdfTest; http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:bvb:19-epub-24764-2Test; https://epub.ub.uni-muenchen.de/24764Test/ |
| DOI: | 10.5282/ubm/epub.24764 |
| الإتاحة: | https://doi.org/10.5282/ubm/epub.24764Test https://epub.ub.uni-muenchen.de/24764/1/500.pdfTest https://epub.ub.uni-muenchen.de/24764Test/ http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:bvb:19-epub-24764-2Test |
| رقم الانضمام: | edsbas.8B42CA3D |
| قاعدة البيانات: | BASE |
| DOI: | 10.5282/ubm/epub.24764 |
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