مؤتمر
Strategic Stability Analysis of a Nonlinear Security Game
| العنوان: | Strategic Stability Analysis of a Nonlinear Security Game |
|---|---|
| المؤلفون: | Boufaied, Jed, Le Hénaff, Jean, Le Cadre, Hélène |
| المساهمون: | Integrated Optimization with Complex Structure (INOCS), Inria Lille - Nord Europe, Institut National de Recherche en Informatique et en Automatique (Inria)-Institut National de Recherche en Informatique et en Automatique (Inria)-Université libre de Bruxelles (ULB)-Centre de Recherche en Informatique, Signal et Automatique de Lille - UMR 9189 (CRIStAL), Centrale Lille-Université de Lille-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)-Centrale Lille-Université de Lille-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS), CEA/DAM Arpajon (CEA/DAM), Direction des Applications Militaires (DAM), Commissariat à l'énergie atomique et aux énergies alternatives (CEA)-Commissariat à l'énergie atomique et aux énergies alternatives (CEA) |
| المصدر: | ROADEF 2024 ; https://inria.hal.science/hal-04490283Test ; ROADEF 2024, Mar 2024, Amiens, France |
| بيانات النشر: | HAL CCSD |
| سنة النشر: | 2024 |
| المجموعة: | HAL-CEA (Commissariat à l'énergie atomique et aux énergies alternatives) |
| مصطلحات موضوعية: | Security Game, Nash Equilibrium, Coercivity, Equilibrium Learning, Partial Equilibrium Model, Security Game Nash Equilibrium Coercivity Equilibrium Learning Partial Equilibrium Model, [INFO.INFO-GT]Computer Science [cs]/Computer Science and Game Theory [cs.GT] |
| جغرافية الموضوع: | Amiens, France |
| الوصف: | National audience ; The primary goal of Nations is to maximize their perceived security, which requires eachNation to develop an effective deterrence strategy [1]. In classical game theoretic models, deterrenceas a military strategy is based upon a standard, iterated two-player prisoner’s dilemmamodel by which cooperation can be assured if a rational player understands the punishmentor cost of defection [2].However, many of the actions taken by Nations in pursuit of the maximization of theirperceived security might, in turn, lead to a decrease rather than an increase in their perceivedsecurity. This dilemma is explained by the fact that the increase in military capability of oneNation might be interpreted as a risk that the arming Nation will use it to perform an attackin the future.In this context, in order to re-establish the balance of power, the other Nations could eitherincrease their own military capabilities or initiate a preemptive strike. Choosing the first optionmay result in a security spiral, in which several Nations are tied in an arms race, and maylead to war in the long run. Such a situation is known as the security dilemma [3], and is onepossible outcome of arms race models.If the goal of game-theoretic models is to quantify the outcomes of situations of conflictbetween armed Nations, non-proliferation policies and containment treaties are often designedwith the goal to stabilize the rivalry between Nations and reduce strategic risks. |
| نوع الوثيقة: | conference object |
| اللغة: | English |
| العلاقة: | hal-04490283; https://inria.hal.science/hal-04490283Test; https://inria.hal.science/hal-04490283/documentTest; https://inria.hal.science/hal-04490283/file/ROADEF_2024__mode%CC%80le_de_document_LaTeX.pdfTest |
| الإتاحة: | https://inria.hal.science/hal-04490283Test https://inria.hal.science/hal-04490283/documentTest https://inria.hal.science/hal-04490283/file/ROADEF_2024__mode%CC%80le_de_document_LaTeX.pdfTest |
| حقوق: | http://creativecommons.org/licenses/byTest/ ; info:eu-repo/semantics/OpenAccess |
| رقم الانضمام: | edsbas.7273DA39 |
| قاعدة البيانات: | BASE |
| الوصف غير متاح. |