دورية أكاديمية

Capital accumulation, welfare and the emergence of pension fund activism

التفاصيل البيبلوغرافية
العنوان: Capital accumulation, welfare and the emergence of pension fund activism
المؤلفون: Belan, Pascal, Michel, Philippe, Wigniolle, Bertrand
المساهمون: Laboratoire d'économie de Nantes (LEN), Institut d'Économie et de Management de Nantes - Institut d'Administration des Entreprises - Nantes (IEMN-IAE Nantes), Université de Nantes (UN)-Université de Nantes (UN), Groupement de Recherche en Économie Quantitative d'Aix-Marseille (GREQAM), École des hautes études en sciences sociales (EHESS)-Aix Marseille Université (AMU)-École Centrale de Marseille (ECM)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS), Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne (CES), Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (UP1)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS), Paris School of Economics (PSE), Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (UP1)-École normale supérieure - Paris (ENS-PSL), Université Paris Sciences et Lettres (PSL)-Université Paris Sciences et Lettres (PSL)-École des hautes études en sciences sociales (EHESS)-École des Ponts ParisTech (ENPC)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)-Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement (INRAE)
المصدر: ISSN: 0015-2218 ; FinanzArchiv / Public Finance Analysis ; https://shs.hal.science/halshs-00268847Test ; FinanzArchiv / Public Finance Analysis, 2007, 23 (2), pp.54-82. ⟨10.1628/001522107X186728⟩.
بيانات النشر: HAL CCSD
Mohr Siebeck
سنة النشر: 2007
المجموعة: Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne: HAL
مصطلحات موضوعية: imperfect competition, capital accumulation, pension funds, altruism, [SHS.ECO]Humanities and Social Sciences/Economics and Finance
الوصف: International audience ; This paper presents an overlapping generations model with altruistic consumers, in which pension funds, by holding a signi.cant share of capital assets, produce non competitive behavior. We study the consequences of such behavior on capital accumulation and welfare in the long run when subsidies are associated with contributions to pension funds. If bequests are operative and the subsidy rate is not too high, the capital stock increases with the introduction of pension funds, and this increases long run utility. If bequests are not operative without pension funds, the rise in long-run welfare is no longer guaranteed, even if the subsidy rate is low.
نوع الوثيقة: article in journal/newspaper
اللغة: English
العلاقة: halshs-00268847; https://shs.hal.science/halshs-00268847Test; https://shs.hal.science/halshs-00268847/documentTest; https://shs.hal.science/halshs-00268847/file/finanzarchiv.pdfTest
DOI: 10.1628/001522107X186728
الإتاحة: https://doi.org/10.1628/001522107X186728Test
https://shs.hal.science/halshs-00268847Test
https://shs.hal.science/halshs-00268847/documentTest
https://shs.hal.science/halshs-00268847/file/finanzarchiv.pdfTest
حقوق: info:eu-repo/semantics/OpenAccess
رقم الانضمام: edsbas.70D0AE84
قاعدة البيانات: BASE