دورية أكاديمية

Security Analysis and Bypass User Authentication Bound to Device of Windows Hello in the Wild

التفاصيل البيبلوغرافية
العنوان: Security Analysis and Bypass User Authentication Bound to Device of Windows Hello in the Wild
المؤلفون: Ejin Kim, Hyoung-Kee Choi
المصدر: Security and Communication Networks, Vol 2021 (2021)
بيانات النشر: Hindawi-Wiley
سنة النشر: 2021
المجموعة: Directory of Open Access Journals: DOAJ Articles
مصطلحات موضوعية: Technology (General), T1-995, Science (General), Q1-390
الوصف: Windows Hello is a Fast IDentity Online- (FIDO-) based new login system for Windows 10, which provides a single sign-on (SSO) service to diverse online applications. Hardware protection is essential for Window Hello’s security. This paper aims to examine the security of Windows Hello on a device where hardware protection is unavailable. We present the first detailed analysis of Windows Hello’s security. The results show that, on a hardware-unsupported device, the authentication data for Windows Hello is not properly protected. We propose a migration attack to compromise Windows Hello’s security. In the proposed attack, an attacker extracts authentication data from a device to impersonate a victim in his or her Microsoft online account. We consider the possibility of such an attack to be serious and harmful to our society and demand immediate attention for remediation.
نوع الوثيقة: article in journal/newspaper
اللغة: English
تدمد: 1939-0114
1939-0122
العلاقة: http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2021/6245306Test; https://doaj.org/toc/1939-0114Test; https://doaj.org/toc/1939-0122Test; https://doaj.org/article/e8791cc6402d4b22a2c03b19834cf87aTest
DOI: 10.1155/2021/6245306
الإتاحة: https://doi.org/10.1155/2021/6245306Test
https://doaj.org/article/e8791cc6402d4b22a2c03b19834cf87aTest
رقم الانضمام: edsbas.13BF46BD
قاعدة البيانات: BASE
الوصف
تدمد:19390114
19390122
DOI:10.1155/2021/6245306