Fiscal policy and corruption
| العنوان: | Fiscal policy and corruption |
|---|---|
| المؤلفون: | Bernard Gauthier, Jonathan Goyette |
| المصدر: | Social Choice and Welfare. 46:57-79 |
| بيانات النشر: | Springer Science and Business Media LLC, 2015. |
| سنة النشر: | 2015 |
| مصطلحات موضوعية: | Economics and Econometrics, Public economics, jel:D73, jel:D82, 05 social sciences, Corruption, Tax evasion, Tax administration, Tax reform, jel:H21, jel:H32, jel:H26, Microeconomics, Value-added tax, Tax credit, Ad valorem tax, 0502 economics and business, State income tax, Economics, Taxpayer, 050207 economics, Optimal tax, Social Sciences (miscellaneous), Indirect tax, 050205 econometrics |
| الوصف: | This paper develops a simple model of corruption between a tax inspector and a taxpayer in which inspectors’ heterogeneity helps explain why it may be optimal for a revenue-maximizing government to tolerate corruption. In our model, tax inspectors could accept a bribe from a taxpayer for under-reporting his income or to avoid harassment in the form of red tape. The government’s problem is to design a tax policy and the associated monitoring probability to enforce it. Raising tax rates increases enforcement costs as it increases bribery incentives, so it is optimal not to set tax rates at a too high level. The optimal tax policy includes an optimal supervision level required to reduce corruption, which in turns depends on tax collectors’ capacity to impose red tape on taxpayers. When bureaucrats are heterogeneous in terms of their capacity to impose red tape costs, an intermediate detection probability might be appropriate efficiency-wise even if it means tolerating some level of corruption. Bureaucrats’ heterogeneity as the likely source of observation of corruption in equilibrium is generic to various environments in which agents’ delegated power is misused for private gains and various examples are discussed in the paper. We also show how a government could face lose–lose as well as win–win situations in the conduct of its revenue collection policies. |
| تدمد: | 1432-217X 0176-1714 |
| الوصول الحر: | https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::fe7536f430e774e992e1f038c7a95890Test https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-015-0903-6Test |
| حقوق: | OPEN |
| رقم الانضمام: | edsair.doi.dedup.....fe7536f430e774e992e1f038c7a95890 |
| قاعدة البيانات: | OpenAIRE |
| تدمد: | 1432217X 01761714 |
|---|