Communities, Co-ops, and Clubs: Social Capital and Incentives in Large Collective Organizations
| العنوان: | Communities, Co-ops, and Clubs: Social Capital and Incentives in Large Collective Organizations |
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| المؤلفون: | Aaron Kolb, Joshua A. Jacobs, Curtis R. Taylor |
| المصدر: | American Economic Journal: Microeconomics. 13:29-69 |
| بيانات النشر: | American Economic Association, 2021. |
| سنة النشر: | 2021 |
| مصطلحات موضوعية: | Transaction cost, Organizational architecture, business.industry, 05 social sciences, Distribution (economics), Microeconomics, Continuation, Incentive, Respite care, Organizational behavior, Reputation system, 0502 economics and business, Economic anthropology, Imperfect, Business, 050207 economics, General Economics, Econometrics and Finance, 050205 econometrics, Social capital |
| الوصف: | We study a continuous-time organization design problem. Each member's output is an imperfect signal of his underlying choice of effort, and each member's utility from remaining in the organization is endogenous to the output of other agents. Monetary transfers are assumed infeasible. Incentives can be provided only through two potential channels: removal due to poor performance (the stick) and rewarding good performance by allowing a "vacation" or respite (the carrot). We derive the steady-state distribution of continuation utilities of agents in the organization and show that both the stick and the carrot are used to provide incentives under an optimal design. Moreover, the optimal organization may be implemented by associating continuation utilities with a reputation system that tracks each member's performance over time. |
| تدمد: | 1945-7685 1945-7669 |
| الوصول الحر: | https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::0617f866e510b0f22696a56951bfc254Test https://doi.org/10.1257/mic.20180359Test |
| رقم الانضمام: | edsair.doi.dedup.....0617f866e510b0f22696a56951bfc254 |
| قاعدة البيانات: | OpenAIRE |
| تدمد: | 19457685 19457669 |
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