PurposeIn the new retail era, the supply chain synergy produced by quality integration has become the new direction of service supply chain research. The purpose of this paper is to study how to promote the sustainable development of the retail service supply chain (RSSC) by comparing and analyzing the optimal quality behavior, optimal returns, and the combination of conditions and strategies of the participating members of the RSSC.Design/methodology/approachFrom the perspective of quality function development and service quality concern, this paper considers RSSC as a two-level supply chain structure composed of functional service provider and retail service integrator. In this paper, a dynamic optimization model of quality input-cooperation-coordination of RSSC is proposed under two quality cooperation modes of decentralization and integration. This paper adopts the differential game method to compare and analyze the optimal quality behavior, optimal income, forming conditions and strategic combination of the participating members of the RSSC in different situations.Findings(1) Compared with quality dispersion, quality integration has more significant Pareto improvement effect on quality behavior and optimal revenue of RSSC. (2) In the case of quality integration, the optimal revenue obtained by the service sharing model is generally better than that obtained by the retail alliance collaboration model. (3) Benefit distribution ratio and quality cost allocation determine the optimal quality behavior of participating members of the RSSC, and also become the key factors for participating members to choose the collaborative mode in the case of quality integration.Originality/valueBased on the quality function development of RSSC, this paper introduces the concept of steady service quality, and discusses the relationship between the quality cooperation stability and the mode selection of RSSC. This provides a theoretical basis for how to build a RSSC with efficient operation and stable quality.
