A Dynamic Game for Essentiality of Fiat Money from the Perspective of GE

التفاصيل البيبلوغرافية
العنوان: A Dynamic Game for Essentiality of Fiat Money from the Perspective of GE
المؤلفون: Zhiping Xie
المصدر: SSRN Electronic Journal.
بيانات النشر: Elsevier BV, 2011.
سنة النشر: 2011
مصطلحات موضوعية: symbols.namesake, Endogenous money, Sequential game, Nash equilibrium, Financial transaction, Fiat money, Money measurement concept, Money illusion, symbols, Economics, Purchasing power, TheoryofComputation_GENERAL, Monetary economics
الوصف: This paper addresses firstly why people have to use fiat money and then why they are rationally willing to accept it from the perspective of general equilibrium by using dynamic game to determine agents' expectation of its purchasing power in unrevealed future. Its model formulates the process that agents determine fiat money's nominal value in an infinite-time decentralized sequence economy where agents use fiat money to bridge markets to avoid huge transaction cost. It is proved that all agents' accepting fiat money with expectation of unchanged nominal value of it is Nash equilibrium so as to guarantee fiat money's essentiality.
تدمد: 1556-5068
الوصول الحر: https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::68ae067e75fec8eadae11786b6f97d1dTest
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1857282Test
رقم الانضمام: edsair.doi...........68ae067e75fec8eadae11786b6f97d1d
قاعدة البيانات: OpenAIRE