التفاصيل البيبلوغرافية
| العنوان: |
Understanding transaction platform governance and conflicts: A configuration approach. |
| المؤلفون: |
Islam, Habib A., Farrell, Matthew, Nair, Anil, Zhang, Jing |
| المصدر: |
Technological Forecasting & Social Change; Apr2023, Vol. 189, pN.PAG-N.PAG, 1p |
| مصطلحات موضوعية: |
TRANSACTION costs, CORPORATE governance, ECONOMIC development, EMPIRICAL research, MIXED methods research |
| مستخلص: |
Transaction platforms, such as Amazon and Uber, are emerging as central players in many segments of the global economy. Extant research has primarily focused on the impact of network effects on platform growth and rivalry, but not much is known about governance configurations in platforms and their impact on outcomes that are crucial to the long-term survival of the platform. In this study, using information asymmetry logic and the organizational governance literature derived from theories of the firm, we propose that the configurations of platform governance rules impact conflicts between platforms and sellers. Our empirical research context is the online auction and mail-order industry. Following an inductive approach, we first identify the sets of rules that platforms use in seller selection and engagement. Next, utilizing fsQCA analysis, we identify multiple configurations of governance rules that lead to different levels of platform-seller conflicts. We also find that effective configurations of governance rules are contingent upon platform strategies. Theoretical and empirical implications of the study on platform governance are discussed. • In this exploratory study we investigate the antecedents of conflicts in platforms. • We argue that governance rules that determine the relationship between platforms and their participants are important to study as they impact platform performance. This perspective led us to explore how platform governance differs from governance within firms and exchanges in traditional markets. Given the novel domain of this research setting, we adopted a multi-method approach to examine our research question. We first used content analysis to identify and categorize platforms' rules to select and engage with their partners. • We then adopted the fsQCA methodology and found that certain combinations of rules led to superior platform performance (defined as fewer lawsuits in this study). Below we elaborate on each of our propositions' theoretical and empirical implications. • We find that requiring less private and sensitive information from sellers may help reduce conflicts between the platform and its sellers. Additionally, we find that interorganizational conflict is a function of the level of autonomy granted to partners. Our finding suggests sharing outcome-based rewards with the sellers is a superior approach to reducing conflict which implies that when studying platform–seller relationships, scholars should not only consider trust-based governance mechanisms but also focus on economic incentives to align platform-seller interests. • Our findings also suggest that effective governance rules are contingent upon platform strategy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR] |
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| قاعدة البيانات: |
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