التفاصيل البيبلوغرافية
| العنوان: |
Pareto efficiency in the dynamic one-dimensional bargaining model. |
| المؤلفون: |
Kalandrakis, Tasos |
| المصدر: |
Journal of Theoretical Politics; Oct2016, Vol. 28 Issue 4, p525-536, 12p |
| مصطلحات موضوعية: |
COORDINATION games (Mathematics), MARKOV processes, EQUILIBRIUM, MEDIAN (Mathematics), PROBABILITY theory, SYMMETRIC domains |
| مستخلص: |
Pareto-dominated agreements are shown to prevail with positive probability in an open set of status quo in a Markov perfect equilibrium of a one-dimensional dynamic bargaining game. This equilibrium is continuous, symmetric, with dynamic preferences that satisfy the single-plateau property. It is also shown that there does not exist a symmetric equilibrium with single-peaked preferences. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR] |
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| قاعدة البيانات: |
Complementary Index |
