التفاصيل البيبلوغرافية
| العنوان: |
Pure strategy Nash equilibria for bargaining models of collective choice. |
| المؤلفون: |
Braack, Malte1 (AUTHOR), Henning, Christian2 (AUTHOR) chenning@ae.uni-kiel.de, Ziesmer, Johannes3 (AUTHOR) |
| المصدر: |
International Journal of Game Theory. Jun2024, Vol. 53 Issue 2, p373-421. 49p. |
| مصطلحات موضوعية: |
*NASH equilibrium, *NEGOTIATION, *GAME theory, SOCIAL choice, MATHEMATICAL proofs |
| مستخلص: |
This paper considers pure strategy Nash equilibria of non-cooperative legislative bargaining models. In contrast to existing legislative bargaining models, we derive legislators behavior from stochastic utility maximization. This approach allows us to prove the existence of a stationary Pure Local and Global Nash Equilibrium under rather general settings. The mathematical proof is based on a fixed point argument, which can also be used as a numerical method to determine an equilibrium. We characterize the equilibrium outcome as a lottery of legislators' proposals and prove a Mean Voter Theorem, i.e., proposals result dimension-by-dimension as a weighted mean of legislators' ideal points and are Pareto-optimal. Based on a simple example, we illustrate different logic of our model compared to mixed strategy equilibrium of the legislative bargaining model suggested by Banks and Duggan (Am Polit Sci Rev 94(1):73–88. https://doi.org/10.2307/2586381Test, 2000). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR] |
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| قاعدة البيانات: |
Business Source Index |
