التفاصيل البيبلوغرافية
| العنوان: |
How Does Downstream Firms' Efficiency Affect Exclusive Supply Agreements? |
| المؤلفون: |
Kitamura, Hiroshi1 (AUTHOR), Matsushima, Noriaki2 (AUTHOR) nmatsush@iser.osaka-u.ac.jp, Sato, Misato3 (AUTHOR) |
| المصدر: |
Review of Industrial Organization. Mar2024, Vol. 64 Issue 2, p219-242. 24p. |
| مصطلحات موضوعية: |
*EXCLUSIVE contracts, *INDUSTRIAL efficiency, *PRICE discrimination, *ANTITRUST law, *MONOPOLIES |
| مستخلص: |
We develop a bilateral monopoly model with a downstream entrant to examine anticompetitive exclusive supply contracts that prevent the upstream supplier from selling inputs to the downstream entrant. When the entrant is more efficient and needs a lesser amount of the input that is produced by the supplier than does the incumbent, the input demand may not increase significantly following the entry. Therefore, the socially efficient entry does not increase the supplier's profits significantly, which allows the downstream incumbent to deter socially efficient entry through an exclusive supply contract. This result holds even in the simplest framework, which is composed of a single seller, buyer, and entrant. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR] |
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| قاعدة البيانات: |
Business Source Index |
