دورية أكاديمية

Intertemporal bargaining predicts moral behavior, even in anonymous, one-shot economic games.

التفاصيل البيبلوغرافية
العنوان: Intertemporal bargaining predicts moral behavior, even in anonymous, one-shot economic games.
المؤلفون: Ainslie, George1,2 George.Ainslie@va.gov
المصدر: Behavioral & Brain Sciences. Feb2013, Vol. 36 Issue 1, p78-79. 2p.
مصطلحات موضوعية: *ETHICS, *SELF-control, *COOPERATIVENESS, *GAME theory, *NEGOTIATION, *PRISONERS
مستخلص: To the extent that acting fairly is in an individual's long-term interest, short-term impulses to cheat present a self-control problem. The only effective solution is to interpret the problem as a variant of repeated prisoner's dilemma, with each choice as a test case predicting future choices. Moral choice appears to be the product of a contract because it comes from self-enforcing intertemporal cooperation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
قاعدة البيانات: Academic Search Index
الوصف
تدمد:0140525X
DOI:10.1017/S0140525X12000684