التفاصيل البيبلوغرافية
| العنوان: |
Nash equilibria for voter models with randomly perceived positions. |
| المؤلفون: |
Rosenthal, Jeffrey S.1 jeff@math.toronto.edu |
| المصدر: |
Stochastic Models. 2018, Vol. 34 Issue 1, p98-114. 17p. 3 Graphs. |
| مصطلحات موضوعية: |
*NASH equilibrium, *MATHEMATICS, *MEDIAN (Mathematics), *ELECTIONS, *VOTERS |
| مستخلص: |
We introduce a voter model in which parties’ intended policy positions are perceived by voters with some random uncertainty. We prove that for a total of three parties, under some mild assumptions, this model has a Nash equilibrium in which all three parties attempt to contest the election with the median policy. This contrasts with Duverger’s Law, which asserts that only two parties will contest the election at all, consistent with some different voter models. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR] |
| قاعدة البيانات: |
Academic Search Index |
