المؤلفون: Bikhchandani, Sushil, Obara, Ichiro

المصدر: Economic Theory. 63(3)

مصطلحات موضوعية: Information acquisition, Full surplus extraction, Efficient implementation, Mechanism design, Bayesian implementation, Economic Theory, Applied Economics, Econometrics

وصف الملف: application/pdf

الوصول الحر: https://escholarship.org/uc/item/7gf3w6mtTest

المؤلفون: Bikhchandani, S., Obara, I.

مصطلحات موضوعية: information acquisition, full surplus extraction, efficient implementation, mechanism design, Bayesian implementation

وصف الملف: application/pdf

الوصول الحر: https://escholarship.org/uc/item/771798jdTest

المؤلفون: Noda, Shunya

مصطلحات موضوعية: ddc:330, C73, D47, D82, D86, Dynamic mechanism design, perfect Bayesian equilibrium, revenue maximization, full surplus extraction

العلاقة: gbv-ppn:166806278X; Journal: Theoretical Economics; Volume: 14; Year: 2019; Issue: 1; Pages: 39-69; New Haven, CT: The Econometric Society; http://hdl.handle.net/10419/217059Test; RePEc:the:publsh:2226

الإتاحة: https://doi.org/10.3982/TE2226Test
http://hdl.handle.net/10419/217059Test

المؤلفون: Krähmer, Daniel

مصطلحات موضوعية: ddc:330, C72, D44, D82, Auction, ex ante investment, full surplus extraction, correlation, mechanism design

العلاقة: Series: Beiträge zur Jahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik 2010: Ökonomie der Familie - Session: Auctions with Asymmetric Information; No. A13-V1; gbv-ppn:654867496; http://hdl.handle.net/10419/37397Test

الإتاحة: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/37397Test

المؤلفون: Tilman, Börgers, author, Daniel, Krähmer, author, Roland, Strausz, author

المصدر: An Introduction to the Theory of Mechanism Design, 2015, ill.

الإتاحة: https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199734023.003.0006Test

المؤلفون: Sushil Bikhchandani, Ichiro Obara

المساهمون: The Pennsylvania State University CiteSeerX Archives

المصدر: http://apps.anderson.ucla.edu/axis/servlet/DownloadProcessor?file_type%3Dwp%26id%3D687076766843724A554E593D%26wp_serial%3D35586C38444659695948453DTest.

مصطلحات موضوعية: information acquisition, full surplus extraction, efficient implemen- tation, mechanism design, Bayesian implementation. 1

العلاقة: http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/summary?doi=10.1.1.696.8437Test; http://apps.anderson.ucla.edu/axis/servlet/DownloadProcessor?file_type%3Dwp%26id%3D687076766843724A554E593D%26wp_serial%3D35586C38444659695948453DTest

الإتاحة: http://apps.anderson.ucla.edu/axis/servlet/DownloadProcessor?file_type%3Dwp%26id%3D687076766843724A554E593D%26wp_serial%3D35586C38444659695948453DTest

المؤلفون: Sushil Bikhchandani, Ichiro Obara

المساهمون: The Pennsylvania State University CiteSeerX Archives

مصطلحات موضوعية: information acquisition, full surplus extraction, efficient implementation, mechanism design

العلاقة: http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/summary?doi=10.1.1.281.2538Test

المؤلفون: Angel Hern, Eugen Kovac, Benny Moldovanu, Tymofiy Mylovanov, Zvika Neeman

المساهمون: The Pennsylvania State University CiteSeerX Archives

المصدر: http://www.wiwi.uni-bonn.de/kraehmer/DK-md-corr.pdfTest.

مصطلحات موضوعية: Auction, ex ante investment, full surplus extraction, correlation, mechanism design

وصف الملف: application/pdf

العلاقة: http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/summary?doi=10.1.1.653.8686Test; http://www.wiwi.uni-bonn.de/kraehmer/DK-md-corr.pdfTest

الإتاحة: http://www.wiwi.uni-bonn.de/kraehmer/DK-md-corr.pdfTest

المؤلفون: Hitoshi Matsushima, Koichi Miyazaki, Nobuyuki Yagi

المساهمون: The Pennsylvania State University CiteSeerX Archives

المصدر: http://www.carf.e.u-tokyo.ac.jp/pdf/workingpaper/fseries/218.pdfTest.

مصطلحات موضوعية: JEL Classification Numbers, C70, D71, D78, D82. Keywords, Multitask Agency, Hidden Information, Group Decisions, No Side Payments, Linking Mechanisms, Characterization, Full Surplus Extraction

وصف الملف: application/pdf

العلاقة: http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/summary?doi=10.1.1.335.4355Test; http://www.carf.e.u-tokyo.ac.jp/pdf/workingpaper/fseries/218.pdfTest

الإتاحة: http://www.carf.e.u-tokyo.ac.jp/pdf/workingpaper/fseries/218.pdfTest

المؤلفون: Hitoshi Matsushima, Koichi Miyazaki, Nobuyuki Yagi

المساهمون: The Pennsylvania State University CiteSeerX Archives

المصدر: http://wakame.econ.hit-u.ac.jp/~riron/Workshop/2006/yagi06.pdfTest.

مصطلحات موضوعية: JEL Classification Numbers, C70, D71, D78, D82. Keywords, Multitask Agency, Hidden Information, Group Decisions, No Side Payments, Linking Mechanisms, Characterization, Full Surplus Extraction. 3

وصف الملف: application/pdf

العلاقة: http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/summary?doi=10.1.1.323.2912Test; http://wakame.econ.hit-u.ac.jp/~riron/Workshop/2006/yagi06.pdfTest

الإتاحة: http://wakame.econ.hit-u.ac.jp/~riron/Workshop/2006/yagi06.pdfTest