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1
المؤلفون: Andersson, Tommy, Svensson, Lars Gunnar
المصدر: Mathematical Social Sciences. 128:1-5
مصطلحات موضوعية: Characterization, House allocation, Multi-object auction, Strategy-proofness, Samhällsvetenskap, Ekonomi och näringsliv, Nationalekonomi, Social Sciences, Economics and Business, Economics
الوصول الحر: https://lup.lub.lu.se/record/bdb6647f-3544-47be-9b82-f0f08ddecaaaTest
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2023.12.004Test -
2
المؤلفون: Andersson, Tommy, Svensson, Lars-Gunnar
المصدر: Working Papers. (2023:11)
مصطلحات موضوعية: Characterization, House allocation, Strategy-proofness, Multi-object auction, D44, D47, D63, D78, D82, Samhällsvetenskap, Ekonomi och näringsliv, Nationalekonomi, Social Sciences, Economics and Business, Economics
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3دورية أكاديمية
المؤلفون: Feng, Di, Klaus, Bettina, Klijn, Flip
المساهمون: Swiss National Science Foundation, Generalitat de Catalunya, Agencia Estatal de Investigación (España), Ministerio de Ciencia, Innovación y Universidades (España), Klaus, Bettina, Klijn, Flip, Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas https://ror.org/02gfc7t72Test
مصطلحات موضوعية: Market design, Multiple-type housing markets, Non-bossiness, Self-enforcing pairwise strategy-proofness, Strategy-proofness, Top-trading-cycles (TTC) mechanism
وصف الملف: application/pdf
العلاقة: #PLACEHOLDER_PARENT_METADATA_VALUE#; info:eu-repo/grantAgreement/AEI/Plan Estatal de Investigación Científica y Técnica y de Innovación 2017-2020/PID2020-114251GB-I00/ES/MERCADOS DE ASIGNACION, ECONOMIA EXPERIMENTAL Y BIENESTAR SUBJETIVO/; info:eu-repo/grantAgreement/AEI//CEX2019-000915-S; Publisher's version; The underlying dataset has been published as supplementary material of the article in the publisher platform at DOI https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2024.04.010Test; https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2024.04.010Test; Sí; Games and Economic Behavior 146: 234-254 (2024); CEX2019-000915-S; http://hdl.handle.net/10261/360471Test; 2-s2.0-85195018715; https://api.elsevier.com/content/abstract/scopus_id/85195018715Test
الإتاحة: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2024.04.010Test
http://hdl.handle.net/10261/360471Test
https://api.elsevier.com/content/abstract/scopus_id/85195018715Test -
4تقرير
المؤلفون: Rodríguez Álvarez, Carmelo
مصطلحات موضوعية: C71, C78, D71, Strategy-Proofness, Single-Peaked Preferences, Social Choice Correspondences, Economía, 53 Ciencias Económicas
وصف الملف: application/pdf
العلاقة: Documentos de trabajo del Instituto Complutense de Análisis Económico; info:eu-repo/grantAgreement/AEI/Plan Estatal de Investigación Científica y Técnica y de Innovación 2017-2020/PID2020-118022GB-I00/ES/DECISIONES COLECTIVAS Y MERCADOS CON INDIVISIBLES/; info:eu-repo/grantAgreement/MINECO// PID2022-138706NB-I00; https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.14352/105005Test; https://www.ucm.es/icae/working-papersTest
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5تقرير
المؤلفون: Serizawa, Shigehiro, Shimada, Natsumi, Tse, Tiffany Tsz Kwan
مصطلحات موضوعية: ddc:330, D44, D82, D61, Market design, Strategy-proofness, Vickrey auction, Hints, Human interaction, Human vs robot rivals
العلاقة: Series: ISER Discussion Paper; No. 1229; gbv-ppn:1889095168; https://hdl.handle.net/10419/296872Test
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6رسالة جامعية
المؤلفون: Rodríguez Álvarez, Carmelo
المساهمون: University/Department: Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Departament d'Economia i d'Història Econòmica
مرشدي الرسالة: Barberà, Salvador, 1946-
المصدر: TDX (Tesis Doctorals en Xarxa)
مصطلحات موضوعية: Strategy-proofness, Candidate Stability, Social choice, Ciències Socials
وصف الملف: application/pdf
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7
المؤلفون: Kumar, Ujjwal, Roy, Souvik, Sen, Arunava, Yadav, Sonal, Zeng, Huaxia
المصدر: Theoretical Economics. 16(4):1195-1220
مصطلحات موضوعية: D71, Local incentive constraints, mechanism design, strategic voting, strategy-proofness
وصف الملف: electronic
الوصول الحر: https://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:umu:diva-189669Test
https://doi.org/10.3982/TE4177Test
https://umu.diva-portal.org/smash/get/diva2:1612690/FULLTEXT01.pdfTest -
8دورية أكاديمية
المؤلفون: Arribillaga, R. Pablo, Massó, Jordi, Neme, Alejandro
مصطلحات موضوعية: ddc:330, D71, division problems, Obvious strategy-proofness, sequential allotment rules, single-peaked preferences
العلاقة: gbv-ppn:1856109690; Journal: Theoretical Economics; Volume: 18; Year: 2023; Issue: 3; Pages: 1023-1061; https://hdl.handle.net/10419/296433Test; RePEc:the:publsh:5111
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9دورية أكاديمية
المؤلفون: Pycia, Marek, Troyan, Peter
المصدر: Pycia, Marek; Troyan, Peter (2023). A theory of simplicity in games and mechanism design. Econometrica, 91(4):1495-1526.
مصطلحات موضوعية: Department of Economics, 330 Economics, Economics and econometrics, one-step simplicity, (strong) obvious strategy-proofness, planning horizon, limited foresight, price and priority mechanisms, ascending auctions, extensive-form games
وصف الملف: application/pdf
العلاقة: https://www.zora.uzh.ch/id/eprint/255005/1/Econometrica___2023___Pycia___A_Theory_of_Simplicity_in_Games_and_Mechanism_Design.pdfTest; urn:issn:0012-9682
الإتاحة: https://doi.org/10.5167/uzh-25500510.3982/ecta16310Test
https://www.zora.uzh.ch/id/eprint/255005Test/
https://www.zora.uzh.ch/id/eprint/255005/1/Econometrica___2023___Pycia___A_Theory_of_Simplicity_in_Games_and_Mechanism_Design.pdfTest -
10دورية أكاديمية
المؤلفون: Jennings, Andrew B., Laraki, Rida, Puppe, Clemens, Varloot, Estelle M.
المصدر: Mathematical Programming ; ISSN: 0025-5610, 1436-4646
مصطلحات موضوعية: Strategy-proofness, Single-peaked preferences, Voting, Consistency, Participation, Proportionality, Linear/uniform median, ddc:330, Economics, info:eu-repo/classification/ddc/330
وصف الملف: application/pdf
العلاقة: info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/wos/001160164300024; info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/issn/0025-5610; info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/issn/1436-4646; https://publikationen.bibliothek.kit.edu/1000161968Test; https://publikationen.bibliothek.kit.edu/1000161968/151310825Test; https://doi.org/10.5445/IR/1000161968Test
الإتاحة: https://doi.org/10.5445/IR/1000161968Test
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10107-023-02010-xTest
https://publikationen.bibliothek.kit.edu/1000161968Test
https://publikationen.bibliothek.kit.edu/1000161968/151310825Test
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