المؤلفون: Yuriy M. Vasiliev, Ekaterina V. Glazunova, Gregory M. Fridman

المصدر: Вестник Воронежского государственного университета: Серия экономика и управление, Iss 1, Pp 16-24 (2024)

مصطلحات موضوعية: matching problem of students to academic trajectories, two-sided matching market, stable matching, lower quota, mathematical programming, Economics as a science, HB71-74, Finance, HG1-9999

وصف الملف: electronic resource

العلاقة: https://journals.vsu.ru/econ/article/view/11838Test; https://doaj.org/toc/1814-2966Test

الوصول الحر: https://doaj.org/article/80e185aec021465c8d2668d166648073Test

المؤلفون: Hakimov, Rustamdjan, Kübler, Dorothea, Pan, Siqi

مصطلحات موضوعية: ddc:330, C92, D47, Matching market, deferred acceptance, serial dictatorship, information acquisition, game theory, lab experiment

العلاقة: gbv-ppn:188408303X; Journal: Quantitative Economics; Volume: 14; Year: 2023; Issue: 4; Pages: 1447-1490; https://hdl.handle.net/10419/296345Test

الإتاحة: https://doi.org/10.3982/QE1955Test
https://hdl.handle.net/10419/296345Test

المؤلفون: He, Yinghua, Magnac, Thierry

المساهمون: Toulouse School of Economics (TSE-R), Université Toulouse Capitole (UT Capitole), Université de Toulouse (UT)-Université de Toulouse (UT)-École des hautes études en sciences sociales (EHESS)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)-Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement (INRAE)

المصدر: ISSN: 0013-0133.

مصطلحات موضوعية: Gale-Shapley Deferred Acceptance Mechanism, Costly Preference Formation, Screening, Stable Matching, Congestion, Matching Market Design, JEL: C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods/C.C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory/C.C7.C78 - Bargaining Theory • Matching Theory, JEL: D - Microeconomics/D.D4 - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design/D.D4.D47 - Market Design, JEL: D - Microeconomics/D.D5 - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium/D.D5.D50 - General, JEL: D - Microeconomics/D.D6 - Welfare Economics/D.D6.D61 - Allocative Efficiency • Cost–Benefit Analysis, JEL: I - Health, Education, and Welfare/I.I2 - Education and Research Institutions/I.I2.I21 - Analysis of Education, [SHS.ECO]Humanities and Social Sciences/Economics and Finance

العلاقة: hal-03979233; https://hal.science/hal-03979233Test; https://hal.science/hal-03979233/documentTest; https://hal.science/hal-03979233/file/wp_tse_870.pdfTest; WOS: 000868955700001

الإتاحة: https://doi.org/10.1093/ej/ueac038Test
https://hal.science/hal-03979233Test
https://hal.science/hal-03979233/documentTest
https://hal.science/hal-03979233/file/wp_tse_870.pdfTest

المؤلفون: Bester, Helmut

مصطلحات موضوعية: fairness, inequity aversion, bargaining, ultimatum game, matching market, search costs, competitive equilibrium, ddc:330

وصف الملف: 32 Seiten; application/pdf

العلاقة: https://refubium.fu-berlin.de/handle/fub188/31262Test; http://dx.doi.org/10.17169/refubium-30998Test; urn:nbn:de:kobv:188-refubium-31262-4

الإتاحة: https://doi.org/10.17169/refubium-30998Test
https://refubium.fu-berlin.de/handle/fub188/31262Test
https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:kobv:188-refubium-31262-4Test

المؤلفون: Grenet, Julien, He, Yinghua, Kübler, Dorothea

المساهمون: Paris School of Economics (PSE), Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (UP1)-École normale supérieure - Paris (ENS-PSL), Université Paris Sciences et Lettres (PSL)-Université Paris Sciences et Lettres (PSL)-École des hautes études en sciences sociales (EHESS)-École des Ponts ParisTech (ENPC)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)-Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement (INRAE), Paris Jourdan Sciences Economiques (PJSE), Rice University Houston, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE-R), Université Toulouse Capitole (UT Capitole), Université de Toulouse (UT)-Université de Toulouse (UT)-École des hautes études en sciences sociales (EHESS)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)-Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement (INRAE), Social Science Research Center Berlin (WZB), Social Science Research Center Berlin, Technical University of Berlin / Technische Universität Berlin (TU), ANR-14-FRAL-0005,FDA,La formation des préférences et les effets de pairs dans l'admission à l'université : L'acceptation doublement différé(2014), ANR-17-EURE-0001,PGSE,Ecole d'Economie de Paris(2017)

المصدر: https://shs.hal.science/halshs-02146792Test ; 2022.

مصطلحات موضوعية: Centralized Matching Market, Gale-Shapley Deferred Acceptance, Mechanism, University Admissions, Early Offers, Information Acquisition, JEL: C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods/C.C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory/C.C7.C78 - Bargaining Theory • Matching Theory, JEL: D - Microeconomics/D.D4 - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design/D.D4.D47 - Market Design, JEL: I - Health, Education, and Welfare/I.I2 - Education and Research Institutions/I.I2.I23 - Higher Education • Research Institutions, JEL: D - Microeconomics/D.D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty/D.D8.D81 - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty, and Uncertainty/D.D8.D83 - Search • Learning • Information and Knowledge • Communication • Belief • Unawareness, [SHS.ECO]Humanities and Social Sciences/Economics and Finance

العلاقة: halshs-02146792; https://shs.hal.science/halshs-02146792Test; https://shs.hal.science/halshs-02146792v3/documentTest; https://shs.hal.science/halshs-02146792v3/file/PSE_WP_2019-24_3.pdfTest

الإتاحة: https://shs.hal.science/halshs-02146792Test
https://shs.hal.science/halshs-02146792v3/documentTest
https://shs.hal.science/halshs-02146792v3/file/PSE_WP_2019-24_3.pdfTest

المؤلفون: B. Shaukat, Q. Kiran, W. Shatanawi, Y. Ali

المصدر: IEEE Access, Vol 7, Pp 94666-94675 (2019)

مصطلحات موضوعية: Bipartite stable matching, complete lattice, Tarski’s fixed point theorem, two-sided matching market, Electrical engineering. Electronics. Nuclear engineering, TK1-9971

وصف الملف: electronic resource

العلاقة: https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/8755978Test/; https://doaj.org/toc/2169-3536Test

الوصول الحر: https://doaj.org/article/70d16ca4d1114868a6b89ae86f4ec227Test

المؤلفون: ÇELİK, Onur Burak

المصدر: International Journal of Contemporary Economics and Administrative Sciences 11(1) 106-116

مصطلحات موضوعية: Matching Theory, Gale-Shapley Algorithm, Football referee assignment, Two-sided matching market

العلاقة: https://zenodo.org/communities/ijceasTest; https://zenodo.org/record/5136520Test; https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.5136520Test; oai:zenodo.org:5136520

الإتاحة: https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.5136520Test
https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.5136519Test
https://zenodo.org/record/5136520Test

المؤلفون: Macho-Stadler, Inés, Pérez-Castrillo, David, Quérou, Nicolas

المساهمون: Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona = Autonomous University of Barcelona = Universidad Autónoma de Barcelona (UAB), Centre d'Economie de l'Environnement - Montpellier (CEE-M), Université de Montpellier (UM)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)-Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement (INRAE)-Institut Agro - Montpellier SupAgro, Institut national d'enseignement supérieur pour l'agriculture, l'alimentation et l'environnement (Institut Agro)-Institut national d'enseignement supérieur pour l'agriculture, l'alimentation et l'environnement (Institut Agro), Spanish Ministry of Science and Innovation and Feder (PGC2018-094348-B-I00 and Severo Ochoa program CEX2019-000915-S), Generalitat de Catalunya (2017SGR-711), and ICREA under the ICREA Academia programm, ANR-16-CE03-0005,GREEN-Econ,Vers une économie plus verte : politiques environnementales et adaptation sociétale(2016)

المصدر: ISSN: 0167-4870 ; Journal of Economic Psychology ; https://hal.inrae.fr/hal-03214933Test ; Journal of Economic Psychology, 2021, 84, pp.102378. ⟨10.1016/j.joep.2021.102378⟩.

مصطلحات موضوعية: Goal-oriented agents, incentives, matching market, JEL: D - Microeconomics/D.D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty/D.D8.D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information • Mechanism Design, and Uncertainty/D.D8.D86 - Economics of Contract: Theory, [SHS]Humanities and Social Sciences, [SHS.ECO]Humanities and Social Sciences/Economics and Finance

العلاقة: hal-03214933; https://hal.inrae.fr/hal-03214933Test; https://hal.inrae.fr/hal-03214933/documentTest; https://hal.inrae.fr/hal-03214933/file/NID-2021-01-21.pdfTest; WOS: 000766627900006

الإتاحة: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.joep.2021.102378Test
https://hal.inrae.fr/hal-03214933Test
https://hal.inrae.fr/hal-03214933/documentTest
https://hal.inrae.fr/hal-03214933/file/NID-2021-01-21.pdfTest

المؤلفون: Macho Stadler, Inés, Pérez-Castrillo, David, Quérou, Nicolas

مصطلحات موضوعية: Goal-oriented agents, Incentives, Matching market

وصف الملف: application/pdf

العلاقة: Ministerio de Ciencia e Innovación CEX2019-000915-S; Ministerio de Ciencia e Innovación PGC2018-094348-B-I00; Agència de Gestió d'Ajuts Universitaris i de Recerca 2017/SGR-711; Journal of Economic Psychology; Vol. 84 (june 2021), p. 102378; https://ddd.uab.cat/record/250620Test; urn:10.1016/j.joep.2021.102378; urn:oai:ddd.uab.cat:250620; urn:scopus_id:85104464255; urn:articleid:01674870v84p102378; urn:oai:egreta.uab.cat:publications/64dcba06-2dda-4980-bd78-899fa6cbc4c9

الإتاحة: https://ddd.uab.cat/record/250620Test

المؤلفون: Hakimov, Rustamdjan, Kübler, Dorothea, Pan, Siqi

مصطلحات موضوعية: ddc:330, C92, D47, Matching market, deferred acceptance, information acquisition, game theory, lab experiment

العلاقة: Series: Discussion Paper; No. 280; gbv-ppn:1755431430; http://hdl.handle.net/10419/233503Test

الإتاحة: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/233503Test