المؤلفون: Zhiping Xie

المصدر: SSRN Electronic Journal.

مصطلحات موضوعية: TheoryofComputation_MISCELLANEOUS, Competition (economics), Microeconomics, symbols.namesake, Matching market, Sequential game, Nash equilibrium, Social cooperation, Fiat money, symbols, Economics, Perfect competition, Monetary economics

الوصف: Kiyotaki-Wright (1991, 1993) ensured fiat money’s essentiality; but they abstract competition away. Therefore, Lagos-Wright (2005) added a frictionless centralized market to their model; however, their method should be improved. This paper directly substitutes perfectly competitive decentralized markets for the randomly matching market to resolve the competition problem. Under a temporary equilibrium framework, it constructs a dynamic game model where agents choose strategies to determine their prediction functions of future nominal prices with respect to past nominal prices. It proves that a combination of the agents’ strategies to fully accept fiat money cooperatively – to avoid tremendous friction – is a Nash Equilibrium.

الوصول الحر: https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::d41fefe1187ff86fa05f01c14350b451Test
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2050751Test

المؤلفون: Zhiping Xie

المصدر: SSRN Electronic Journal.

مصطلحات موضوعية: symbols.namesake, Endogenous money, Sequential game, Nash equilibrium, Financial transaction, Fiat money, Money measurement concept, Money illusion, symbols, Economics, Purchasing power, TheoryofComputation_GENERAL, Monetary economics

الوصف: This paper addresses firstly why people have to use fiat money and then why they are rationally willing to accept it from the perspective of general equilibrium by using dynamic game to determine agents' expectation of its purchasing power in unrevealed future. Its model formulates the process that agents determine fiat money's nominal value in an infinite-time decentralized sequence economy where agents use fiat money to bridge markets to avoid huge transaction cost. It is proved that all agents' accepting fiat money with expectation of unchanged nominal value of it is Nash equilibrium so as to guarantee fiat money's essentiality.

الوصول الحر: https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::68ae067e75fec8eadae11786b6f97d1dTest
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1857282Test

المؤلفون: Zhiping Xie

المصدر: SSRN Electronic Journal.

مصطلحات موضوعية: Transaction cost, symbols.namesake, Endogenous money, Sequential game, General equilibrium theory, Process (engineering), Nash equilibrium, Fiat money, symbols, Competitive economy, Economics, TheoryofComputation_GENERAL, Monetary economics

الوصف: This paper mainly addresses why people are rationally willing to cooperate with one another to accept fiat money from the perspective of decentralized sequential general equilibrium framework by using dynamic game to determine agents’ expectation of nominal prices in unrevealed future. The model formulates the process that agents determine fiat money’s nominal value competitively in an infinite-time decentralized sequence economy where agents use fiat money to bridge markets to avoid the huge transaction cost. It is proved that all agents’ expectation with fiat money’s unchanged nominal value is self-fulfilling with a Nash Equilibrium so as to guarantee fiat money’s essentiality.

الوصول الحر: https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::d9f361558a1009ec600e6eea53e71169Test
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1935730Test