المؤلفون: Zeeshan Samad

المصدر: Frontiers in Behavioral Economics, Vol 3 (2024)

مصطلحات موضوعية: self-deception, self-image, altruism, motivated beliefs, belief manipulation, ambiguity aversion, Economic theory. Demography, HB1-3840

الوصف: This paper demonstrates how people can manipulate their beliefs in order to obtain the self-image of an altruistic person. I present an online experiment in which subjects need to decide whether to behave altruistically or selfishly in an ambiguous environment. Due to the nature of ambiguity in this environment, those who are pessimistic have a legitimate reason to behave selfishly. Thus, subjects who are selfish but like to think of themselves as altruistic have an incentive to overstate their pessimism. In the experiment, I ask subjects how optimistic or pessimistic they feel about an ambiguous probability and then, through a separate task, I elicit their true beliefs about the same probability. I find that selfish subjects claim to be systematically more pessimistic than they truly are whereas altruistic subjects report their pessimism (or optimism) truthfully. Given the experiment design, the only plausible explanation for this discrepancy is that selfish subjects deliberately overstate their pessimism in order to maintain the self-image of an altruistic person. Altruistic subjects, whose behavior has already proven their altruism, have no such need for belief manipulation.JEL ClassificationsC91, D82, D83, D84.

وصف الملف: electronic resource

العلاقة: https://www.frontiersin.org/articles/10.3389/frbhe.2024.1412437/fullTest; https://doaj.org/toc/2813-5296Test

الوصول الحر: https://doaj.org/article/10de2428b6be44549a81e88657e7ff01Test

المؤلفون: Kagan, Shelly, author

المصدر: Answering Moral Skepticism, 2023.

الإتاحة: https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780197688977.003.0006Test

المؤلفون: Prati, Alberto, Saucet, Charlotte

المساهمون: University of Oxford, University College of London London (UCL), London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE), Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - École d'économie de la Sorbonne (UP1 UFR02), Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (UP1), Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne (CES), Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (UP1)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)

المصدر: ISSN: 0167-6296 ; Journal of Health Economics ; https://hal.science/hal-04512861Test ; Journal of Health Economics, 2024, 94, pp.102864. ⟨10.1016/j.jhealeco.2024.102864⟩.

مصطلحات موضوعية: COVID-19, Motivated beliefs, Motivated memory, Over-inference, Natural experiment, Behavioral health economics, JEL: D - Microeconomics/D.D9 - Intertemporal Choice/D.D9.D91 - Intertemporal Household Choice • Life Cycle Models and Saving, JEL: I - Health, Education, and Welfare/I.I1 - Health/I.I1.I12 - Health Behavior, and Welfare/I.I1 - Health/I.I1.I18 - Government Policy • Regulation • Public Health, [SHS.ECO]Humanities and Social Sciences/Economics and Finance

الوصف: International audience ; The paper estimates the causal effect of a health treatment on patients' beliefs, preferences and memories about the treatment. It exploits a natural experiment which occurred in the United Kingdom during the COVID-19 vaccination campaign. UK residents could choose to opt into the vaccination program, but not which vaccine they received. The assignment to a vaccine offered little objective information for learning about its qualities, but triggered strong psychological demand for reassuring beliefs. We surveyed a sample of UK residents about their beliefs on the different COVID-19 vaccines before and after receiving their jab. Before vaccination, individuals exhibit similar prior beliefs and stated preferences about the different vaccines. After vaccination, however, they update their beliefs overly optimistically about the safety and effectiveness of the vaccine they received, state that they would have chosen it if they could, and have distorted memories about their past beliefs. These results cannot be explained by conventional experience effects. At the aggregated level, they show that random assignment to a health treatment predicts a polarization of opinions about its quality. At the individual level, these findings provide evidence in line with the predictions of motivated beliefs and over-inference from weak signals in a real-world health setting.

العلاقة: hal-04512861; https://hal.science/hal-04512861Test; https://hal.science/hal-04512861/documentTest; https://hal.science/hal-04512861/file/JHE_March24.pdfTest

الإتاحة: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jhealeco.2024.102864Test
https://hal.science/hal-04512861Test
https://hal.science/hal-04512861/documentTest
https://hal.science/hal-04512861/file/JHE_March24.pdfTest

المؤلفون: Flores, LQ, Fonseca, MA

مصطلحات موضوعية: Overconfidence, belief updating, motivated beliefs, overplacement, social identity, competition

الوصف: This is the author accepted manuscript. The final version is available on open access from Elsevier via the DOI in this record ; Is the phenomenon of people overestimating their skill relative to their peers (overplacement) exacerbated by group affiliation? Social identity theory predicts people evaluate in-group members more positively than out-group members, and we hypothesized that this differential treatment may result in greater overplacement when interacting with an out-group member. We tested this hypothesis with 301 US voters affiliated with either the Republican or Democratic party in the run-up to the 2020 Presidential election, a time when political identities were salient and highly polarized. We found there is a higher tendency for overplacement when faced with an out-group opponent than with an in-group opponent. Decomposition analysis suggests this difference is due to underestimating the opponent, as opposed to overestimating one’s own performance to a higher degree. Moreover, any tendency to incur in overplacement is mitigated when faced with an opponent with the same political identity relative to one with a neutral one. Group affiliation biases initial priors, but not how they are updated. ; Fundação para a Ciência e a Tecnologia (FCT)

العلاقة: orcid:0000-0002-5294-6784 (Fonseca, Miguel Alexandre); Article 102217; SFRH/BD/136976/2018; UIDB/04105/2020; http://hdl.handle.net/10871/135811Test; Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics

الإتاحة: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.socec.2024.102217Test
http://hdl.handle.net/10871/135811Test

المؤلفون: Gneezy, Uri, Saccardo, Silvia, Serra-Garcia, Marta, van Veldhuizen, Roel

مصطلحات موضوعية: Advice, Self-deception, Self-image, Motivated beliefs, Laboratory experiment, Self-Deception, Self-Image, Motivated Beliefs, Laboratory Experiment, Economic Theory, Applied Economics

وصف الملف: application/pdf

الوصول الحر: https://escholarship.org/uc/item/5g73d0ttTest

المؤلفون: Grunewald, Andreas, Klockmann, Victor, von Schenk, Alicia, von Siemens, Ferdinand

مصطلحات موضوعية: ddc:330, C91, C92, D83, Belief bias, Social interaction, Motivated beliefs

الوصف: This paper examines the potential reinforcement of motivated beliefs when individuals with identical biases communicate. We propose a controlled online experiment that allows to manipulate belief biases and the communication environment. We find that communication, even among like-minded individuals, diminishes motivated beliefs if it takes place in an environment without previously declared external opinions. In the presence of external plural opinions, however, communication does not reduce but rather aggravates motivated beliefs. Our results indicate a potential drawback of the plurality of opinions-it may create communication environments wherein motivated beliefs not only persist but also become contagious within social networks.

العلاقة: Series: Würzburg Economic Papers; No. 109; gbv-ppn:1880413671; urn:nbn:de:bvb:20-opus-348936; http://hdl.handle.net/10419/282999Test; RePEc:zbw:wuewep:282999

الإتاحة: https://doi.org/10.25972/OPUS-34893Test
http://hdl.handle.net/10419/282999Test
https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:bvb:20-opus-348936Test

المؤلفون: Hagenbach, Jeanne, Saucet, Charlotte

المساهمون: Département d'économie (Sciences Po) (ECON), Sciences Po (Sciences Po)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS), Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - École d'économie de la Sorbonne (UP1 UFR02), Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (UP1), Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne (CES), Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (UP1)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS), European Project: 850996,H2020-EU.1.1. - EXCELLENT SCIENCE - European Research Council (ERC),ERC-2019-STG,MOREV(2020)

المصدر: https://hal.science/hal-03770685Test ; 2024.

مصطلحات موضوعية: Disclosure games, Hard information, Unraveling result, Skepticism, Motivated beliefs, Endogenous depth of reading, JEL: C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods/C.C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory/C.C7.C72 - Noncooperative Games, JEL: C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods/C.C9 - Design of Experiments/C.C9.C91 - Laboratory, Individual Behavior, JEL: D - Microeconomics/D.D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty/D.D8.D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information • Mechanism Design, JEL: D - Microeconomics/D.D9 - Intertemporal Choice/D.D9.D91 - Intertemporal Household Choice • Life Cycle Models and Saving, [SHS.ECO]Humanities and Social Sciences/Economics and Finance

الوصف: We experimentally study how individuals read strategically-transmitted information when they have preferences over what they will learn. Subjects play disclosure games in which Receivers should interpret messages skeptically. We vary whether the state that Senders communicate about is ego-relevant or neutral for Receivers, and whether skeptical beliefs are aligned or not with what Receivers prefer believing. Compared to neutral settings, skepticism is significantly lower when it is self-threatening, and not enhanced when it is self-serving. These results shed light on a new channel that individuals can use to protect their beliefs in communication situations: they exercise skepticism in a motivated way, that is, in a way that depends on the desirability of the conclusions that skeptical inferences lead to. We propose two behavioral models that can generate motivated skepticism. In one model, the Receiver freely manipulates his beliefs after having made skeptical inferences. In the other, the Receiver reasons about evidence in steps and the depth of his reasoning is motivated.

العلاقة: info:eu-repo/grantAgreement//850996/EU/Motivated Reading of Evidence/MOREV; hal-03770685; https://hal.science/hal-03770685Test; https://hal.science/hal-03770685v2/documentTest; https://hal.science/hal-03770685v2/file/2024_jeanne_hagenbach_and_charlotte_saucet_motivated_skepticism.pdfTest

الإتاحة: https://hal.science/hal-03770685Test
https://hal.science/hal-03770685v2/documentTest
https://hal.science/hal-03770685v2/file/2024_jeanne_hagenbach_and_charlotte_saucet_motivated_skepticism.pdfTest

المؤلفون: Charness, Gary, Rodríguez-Lara, Ismael

مصطلحات موضوعية: Verdad y mentira, Autopercepción, Creencias, Lying behavior, Personal information, Impersonal information, Self-concept-maintenance, Moral costs, Motivated beliefs

الوصف: Using the mind game, we provide experimental evidence that people are more likely to lie when they disclose non-personal information (e.g., reporting a number they thought of) compared with personal information (e.g., reporting the last digit of their birth year). Our findings suggest that the type of information is an important factor for lying behavior. ; Funding for open access charge: Universidad de Málaga/CBUA. The project was innitated while Ismael was visiting the University of Verona. He would like to thank Marco Piovesan, Simone Quercia, and other colleages from the Economics Department for their hopistality. Ismael Rodriguez-Lara acknowledges financial support from the Ministerio de Ciencia e Innovación under the project PID2022-142943NB-I00 as well as from the Junta de Andalucia under the FEDER I+D+i projects B‐SEJ‐206‐UGR20 and P20_00069.

العلاقة: Gary Charness, Ismael Rodriguez-Lara, Personal lies, Economics Letters, Volume 235, 2024, 111496, ISSN 0165-1765, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2023.111496Test. (https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0165176523005220Test); https://hdl.handle.net/10630/29309Test

الإتاحة: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2023.111496Test
https://hdl.handle.net/10630/29309Test

المؤلفون: Ma, Mingye

المساهمون: Kornienko, Tatiana, Hopkins, Ed

مصطلحات موضوعية: 303.3, social learning, motivated beliefs, individual heterogeneity, overconfident beliefs, economic motivations

الوصف: This thesis contains four chapters presenting theory and empirical evidence for two distinct aspects of human behaviour: social learning and motivated beliefs. I develop a simple theory to revisit the classical social learning models by challenging the assumption of freely available information. My model suggests that when it is costly to acquire information, social learning (herding) is prevalent, and people do not have incentives to acquire private information (e.g. to form their own judgements). Classical information cascade models suggest that although herding is observed, information aggregation is still possible with communication channels (e.g. a survey); however, my model indicates that information aggregation is unattainable because people in the herd do not acquire private information. We then test my model in a laboratory and find that, as predicted, subjects can learn from others successfully. Also, individual heterogeneity exists in: there are herd animals biased against private information, lone wolves who are biased toward it and subjects who behave optimally. In aggregate, there is no overall bias for or against private information. We also document a new cognitive bias involved in processing social information. Individual characteristics, especially the cognitive ability, seems to be a very good indicator of subjects' behaviour. Subjects with higher cognitive scores choose optimal information more frequently and follow information more frequently. Overconfidence can be driven by the consumption motive (e.g. savouring future payoff/self-image) and the instrumental motive (e.g. being optimistic about the outcome of effort for motivation). I develop a simple model incorporating these two motives and suggest that individuals hold a dynamic pattern of overconfidence. Then I conduct an online field experiment with students to test the theory. The experimental findings indicate that students are likely to adopt overconfident beliefs as a commitment device to deal with their self-control problem. However, I do not find evidence for the consumption motive of overconfidence.

الوصول الحر: https://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.756616Test

المؤلفون: Ahrens, Steffen, Bosch-Rosa, Ciril

مصطلحات موضوعية: Moral Hazard, Experiment, Motivated Beliefs, Social Preferences, ddc:330

الوصف: Using a new experimental design, we compare how subjects form beliefs in an investorclient setup under varying degrees of liability. Our results re ect the importance of social preferences when making investment decisions for others. We show that when investors have no liability, those with stronger social preferences are more optimistic about the probability that their investment results in a gain. In other words, we nd that social preferences appear to be correlated with motivated beliefs. This nding suggests the existence of cognitive biases in nancial decision-making and supports the recent literature on the formation of motivated beliefs under limited liability (Barberis, 2015; B enabou and Tirole, 2016).

وصف الملف: 33 S.; application/pdf

العلاقة: https://refubium.fu-berlin.de/handle/fub188/36622Test; http://dx.doi.org/10.17169/refubium-36335Test; urn:nbn:de:kobv:188-refubium-36622-5

الإتاحة: https://doi.org/10.17169/refubium-36335Test
https://refubium.fu-berlin.de/handle/fub188/36622Test
https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:kobv:188-refubium-36622-5Test