المؤلفون: Arvaniti, Maria, B. Krishnamurthy, Chandra Kiran, 1977, Crepin, Anne-Sophie

المصدر: Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization. 207:479-495

مصطلحات موضوعية: Renewable resources, Regime shifts, Hyperbolic discounting, Present bias, Uncertainty, Markov equilibrium

الوصف: We investigate the extraction plan of present-biased decision makers managing a renew-able resource stock whose growth is uncertain and which could undergo a rapid and sig-nificant change when stock falls below a threshold. We show that the Markov-Nash equi-librium extraction policy is unique, time consistent, and increasing in resource stock. An increase in the threshold leads to increased resource extraction, rather than the precau-tionary reduction in extraction often observed with exponential discounting. An increase in the degree of present bias also leads to an increase in resource extraction. Our analy-sis suggests that accounting for and appropriately dealing with resource managers' present bias may be important to understand resource use sustainability.

وصف الملف: electronic

الوصول الحر: https://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:umu:diva-217968Test
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2023.01.016Test
https://umu.diva-portal.org/smash/get/diva2:1819647/FULLTEXT01.pdfTest

المؤلفون: López, Rafael

المساهمون: University/Department: Universitat Pompeu Fabra. Departament d'Economia i Empresa

مرشدي الرسالة: Vega-Redondo, Fernando

المصدر: TDX (Tesis Doctorals en Xarxa)

مصطلحات موضوعية: Addiction, Self-Control, Negative Internalities, Habit Formation, Hyperbolic Discounting, Naïveté, Sophistication, Time Inconsistency, Beauty Contest, Multiple equilibrium, Iterated Dominance, Iterated Best-reply

الوصف: This thesis can be divided into two (unrelated) parts. The main part (Chapters 1 and 2) focus on addiction models that entail departures from the classical discounting utility model of Individual Intertemporal Choice: Habit-Formation and Self-Control problems. The other part (Chapter 3) studies the famous p-Beauty Contest Game when we restrict the individual’s choices to integer numbers. In the first part, habit formation is the key feature for a product being addictive: a habit is created when past consumption of the product increases current desire for consumption. An addiction can be either beneficial (when past consumption increases current utility, e.g. jogging) or harmful (when past consumption decreases current utility, e.g. drug consumption). In general one could conceive of harmful addictions as habit-forming activities that imply an immediate reward but generate future costs (negative internalities) whereas beneficial addictions imply an immediate cost but generate future rewards (positive internalities). Self-control problems are understood in terms of time inconsistency: they arise when the individual cannot keep up with an intended intertemporal plan of consumption. In Chapter 1 we analyse a (harmful) addiction model proposed by O'Donoghue and Rabin (O&R) for which they obtain a counterintuitive result: full awareness of selfcontrol problems may exacerbate over-consumption. We show that this result arises from their particular equilibrium selection for the induced intrapersonal game. We provide dominating Markov Perfect equilibria where the paradox vanishes and that seem more ''natural'' since they capture behaviours often observed in the realm of addiction. We also address the issue of why a person could decide to start consuming and possibly develop an addiction: contrary to O&R, and according to the common intuition, we show that naiveté is at the essence. In Chapter 2 we obtain an isomorphism between harmful and beneficial addictions in a discrete-time binary choice context (the model of the first chapter being a particular case of this context). The equivalence thus established allows us to study both phenomena (harmful and beneficial addictions) as two sides of the same coin. Besides the theoretical insight it provides, this dualism is also useful: in particular, it permits to readily translate the results obtained in the first chapter to the domain of beneficial addictions. Once the dualism is established, we analyse addictions under both timeconsistent and time-inconsistent preferences. In Chapter 3, we provide a full characterization of the pure-strategy Nash Equilibria for the p-Beauty Contest Game when we restrict individual's choices to integer numbers. Opposed to the case of real number choices, equilibrium uniqueness may be lost depending on the value of p and the number of players: in particular, as p approaches 1 any symmetric profile constitutes a Nash Equilibrium. We also show that any experimental p-Beauty Contest Game can be associated to a game with the integer restriction and thus multiplicity of equilibria becomes an issue. Finally, we show that in these games the iterated deletion of weakly dominated strategies may not lead to a single outcome while the iterated best-reply process always does (though the outcome obtained depends on the initial conditions).

الوصف (مترجم): Programa de doctorat en Economia, Finances i Empresa

وصف الملف: application/pdf

الوصول الحر: http://hdl.handle.net/10803/289624Test

المؤلفون: Viviana Ventre, Roberta Martino, María José Muñoz Torrecillas

المصدر: Heliyon, Vol 10, Iss 5, Pp e27253- (2024)

مصطلحات موضوعية: Intertemporal choice, Hyperbolic discounting, Inconsistency, Financial literacy, MiFID, Investor profiling, Science (General), Q1-390, Social sciences (General), H1-99

الوصف: Intertemporal choice refers to the decision-making process involving trade-offs between rewards available at different points in time (such as choosing between smaller immediate rewards versus larger rewards later on). Empirical evidence often deviates from the exponential preferences predicted by the normative model. A hyperbolic discount function better mirrors individual behavior, explaining temporal inconsistency – whereby preferences vary over time by applying a higher discount in the present. Hyperbolic preferences are associated with addictive behaviors, such as smoking and alcohol consumption, as well as depression or attention deficit hyperactivity disorder. Established measures in the literature quantify the extent of deviation from exponential trend exhibited by hyperbolic preferences.In addition to behavioral and cognitive factors, it is essential to incorporate financial literacy into the examination of individual decision-making behaviors. The present study analyzes the relationship between the degree of decision-making inconsistency and the degree of financial literacy inconsistency across three dimensions: knowledge, behavior, and attitudes. It aims to illustrate while financial literacy is important, it is not sufficient to ensure rational choices. Rather, it reveals a strong correlation among its dimensions. The results of this research could be included when creating investor profiles required by MiFID, considering insights from behavioral finance studies in these profiles. What is more, understanding psychological biases that can influence financial decision-making empowers investors to make more informed decisions and avoid common pitfalls.

وصف الملف: electronic resource

العلاقة: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2405844024032845Test; https://doaj.org/toc/2405-8440Test

الوصول الحر: https://doaj.org/article/dc7ebd7ec0dd430298182eab59d90b2bTest

المؤلفون: Salvador Cruz Rambaud, Jorge Hernandez-Perez

المصدر: Quantitative Finance and Economics, Vol 7, Iss 3, Pp 463-474 (2023)

مصطلحات موضوعية: discount function, intertemporal choice, hyperbolic discounting, mental operations, functional analysis, Applied mathematics. Quantitative methods, T57-57.97, Finance, HG1-9999

الوصف: Background: Intertemporal decision-making, which involves making choices between outcomes at different time points, is a fundamental aspect of human behavior. Understanding the underlying mental processes is vital for comprehending the complexities of human decision-making and choice behavior. Objective: The main objective of this study is to investigate the interplay of mental processes, specifically cognitive evaluation, subjective valuation, and comparison, in the context of intertemporal decision-making, with a specific focus on understanding the discounting process. Methodology: Development of a mathematical representation of the discounting process that incorporates the mental processes associated with intertemporal decision-making. Result: Our findings indicate that hyperbolic discounting aligns well with the cognitive processes underlying intertemporal decision-making. Subsequent research will employ qualitative questionnaires to establish the discount function relevant to specific groups, thereby enhancing our comprehension of the discounting process within intertemporal decision-making.

وصف الملف: electronic resource

العلاقة: https://doaj.org/toc/2573-0134Test

الوصول الحر: https://doaj.org/article/8903bbe1949e4420a9b48d55c83efa8eTest

المؤلفون: Enke, Benjamin, Graeber, Thomas, Oprea, Ryan, Bernheim, Douglas, Beshears, John, Crawford, Vincent, Laibson, David, Malmendier, Ulrike

مصطلحات موضوعية: Present bias, Complexity, Noise, Hyperbolic discounting, Bounded rationality, Cognitive uncertainty

الوصف: We provide experimental evidence that core intertemporal choice anomalies – including extreme short-run impatience, structural estimates of present bias, hyperbolicity and transitivity violations – are driven by complexity rather than time or risk preferences. First, all anomalies also arise in structurally similar atemporal deci-sion problems involving valuation of iteratively discounted (but immediately paid) rewards. These computational errors are strongly predictive of intertemporal decisions. Second, intertemporal choice anomalies are highly correlated with indices of complexity responses including cognitive uncertainty and choice inconsistency. We show that model misspecification resulting from ignoring behavioral responses to complexity severely inflates structural estimates of present bias. ...

الإتاحة: https://doi.org/10.25740/br438ps6519Test
https://purl.stanford.edu/br438ps6519Test

المؤلفون: Yuwei, Gao, Chen, Yuan, Zhu, Yangguang, Du, Shaofu

المصدر: Journal of Modelling in Management, 2022, Vol. 18, Issue 2, pp. 480-502.

الوصول الحر: http://www.emeraldinsight.com/doi/10.1108/JM2-09-2021-0219Test

المؤلفون: Ata Nurcan, Husniye Nur

المساهمون: University/Department: Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Departament d'Economia i d'Història Econòmica

مرشدي الرسالة: Caballé, Jordi

المصدر: TDX (Tesis Doctorals en Xarxa)

مصطلحات موضوعية: Consumer debt, Hyperbolic Discounting, Self-control, Ciències Socials

الوصف: A la hora de comprar a crédito, la evidencia empírica así como la meramente anecdótica sugieren que los consumidores se centras más en la cuantía de los pagos mensuales que en el tipo de interés del préstamo o la cantidad total que han de pagar. Los dos primeros capítulos de esta tesis exploran el papel del los problemas de auto control a la hora de explicar este comportamiento. Nuestro análisis se basa en el supuesto de descuento hiperbólico (Laibson (1997)) como forma de modelar el auto control. En el primer capitulo de la tesis consideramos un modelo de equilibrio parcial en el que la duración del préstamo y el tipo de interés están fijos y los consumidores pueden elegir cuánto tomar prestado y como repartir la devolución del préstamo entre los diferentes periodos. Mostramos que tener problemas de auto control implica mayores niveles de endeudamiento y que ser consciente de estos problemas o poseer la capacidad de comprometerse a un curso de acción reduce la presión sobre esos niveles. También demostramos que tener problemas de auto control y ser naif sobre ellos puede inducir una preferencia por los préstamos que requieren mayores cuotas hacia el final de su duración. El segundo capitulo analiza la interacción entre un prestamista monopolístico y un consumidor con descuento cuasi hiperbólico en un modelo en el que asumimos cuotas mensuales idénticas y permitimos al consumidor elegir entre distintas duraciones del préstamo. Obtenemos que mientras el tipo de interés del préstamo permanezca por encima del tipo de interés de mercado, en un contrato de equilibrio los consumidores con preferencias dinámicamente inconsistentes eligen préstamos con mayor duración (y por lo tanto con cuotas mensuales más bajas)El tercer capitulo de esta tesis, un trabajo conjunto con Alena Bicakova, proporciona evidencia empírica sobre el impacto de los problemas de auto control en el comportamiento de los consumidores a la hora de pagar sus deudas. El análisis viene motivado por resultados de encuestas que indican que un porcentaje significativo de los prestatarios atribuyen a una mala gestión de la deuda sus dificultades financieras. Esto contrasta con el argumento económico estándar según el cual la falta de pago de una deuda se debe a shocks negativos inesperados ya sea en los ingresos o en los gastos. Nuestra conjetura es que la mala gestión de la deuda y la falta de autocontrol están relacionadas y que tienen efectos adversos sobre el comportamiento de los prestatarios a la hora de devolver su deuda. Con el fin de verificar esta conjetura utilizamos una base de datos única en su naturaleza y procedente de una organización benéfica dedicada a la orientación a consumidores con créditos del Reino Unido. La orientación de crédito asiste a prestatarios seriamente endeudados mediante la elaboración y administración de unos planes de repago llamados Planes de Gestión de Deuda (DMP en ingles). Mostramos que la probabilidad de abandonar un DMP aumenta en un 12% y en un 31% respectivamente cuando las razones que se aducen para explicar el exceso de deuda (relacionadas con su mala gestión) y fumar se utilizan como indicadores. Como hasta cierto punto estos indicadores pueden usarse como una medida aproximada de los problemas de auto control, nuestros resultados sugieren una potencial relación entre las tasas de morosidad y la falta de auto control.

الوصف (مترجم): When buying on credit, anecdotal and empirical evidence suggest that the consumers focus more on the size of the monthly payments than on the interest charged on the loan or the total amount they pay. The first two chapters of this thesis aim to explore the role of self-control problems in explaining this puzzling behaviour. Our analysis relies on the assumption of the "quasi-hyperbolic discounting" (Laibson (1997)) to model self-control. In the first chapter of the thesis, we consider a partial equilibrium setting in which the loan maturity and the interest rates are fixed and the consumers can choose how much to borrow and how to allocate the repayments between different periods. We show that having self-control problems implies higher levels of borrowing whilst awareness of self-control problems or a lack of commitment puts downward pressure on that level. We also demonstrate that having self-control problems and being naive about them can induce a preference for back-loaded repayment plans which require higher repayments towards the end of the loan term. The second chapter looks at the interaction between a monopolistic lender and a consumer with quasi-hyperbolic discounting in a setting where we assume equal monthly payments and allow the consumer to choose between different loan maturities. We show that when market risk free rate exceeds the long run discount rate, in an equilibrium contract, the consumers with dynamically inconsistent preferences choose the loan with longer maturity (hence lower monthly payments). Third chapter of this thesis, which is a joint work with Alena Bicakova, provides empirical evidence on the impact of self-control problems on consumers' debt repayment behaviour. The analysis is motivated by the survey evidence which shows that a significant percentage of borrowers blame the debt mismanagement as the reason for running into financial troubles. This contrasts with the standard economic argument that default on debt is caused by the unexpected negative shocks to income or to expenditure. Our conjecture is that the debt mismanagement and lack of self-control are linked, and they have adverse effects on the debt repayment performance of the borrowers. In order to test this conjecture, we use a unique administrative data set of a major consumer credit counselling charity in the UK. Credit counselling assists heavily indebted borrowers by setting up and administering repayment plans, so called debt management plans or DMPs. We show that probability of dropping out from a DMP increases by 12 per cent and 31 cent when the self-reported reasons for becoming overindebted (related to debt mismanagement) and smoking are used as indicators, respectively. To the extent that these indicators can be used as a valid proxy for self-control problems, our results point to a potential link between default rates and lack of self-control.

وصف الملف: application/pdf

الوصول الحر: http://www.tdx.cat/TDX-0319110-140513Test
http://hdl.handle.net/10803/4088Test

المؤلفون: Steininger, Bertram I., Groth, Martin, Weber, Birgitte

المصدر: Journal of Property Investment & Finance. 39(3):256-282

مصطلحات موضوعية: cost overrun, time overrun, infrastructure, reference class forecasting, hyperbolic discounting, principal-agent theory, Nationalekonomi, Economics, Planering och beslutsanalys, Planning and Decision Analysis, Urban and Regional Studies, Urbana och regionala studier, Fastigheter och byggande, Real Estate and Construction Management

الوصف: Purpose: We investigate causes for the cost overrun and delay of the railway project Stuttgart 21. Besides, we try to forecast the actual costs and completion date at an early stage. Design/methodology/approach: The results of exploratory research show the causes for the cost overrun and delay of Stuttgart 21; we compare our findings with other railway projects. To estimate the costs at an early stage, the reference class forecasting (RCF) model is applied; to estimate the time, we apply an OLS regression. Findings: We find that the following causes are relevant for the cost overrun and delay of Stuttgart 21: scope changes, geological conditions, high risk-taking propensity, extended implementation, price overshoot, conflict of interests and lack of citizens' participation. The current estimated costs are within our 95% confidence interval based on RCF; our time forecast underestimates or substantially overestimates the duration actually required. Research limitations/implications: A limitation of our approach is the low number of comparable projects which are available. Practical implications: The use of hyperbolic function or stepwise exponential discount function can help to give a clearer picture of the costs and benefits. The straightforward use of the RFC for costs and OLS for time should motivate more decision-makers to estimate the actual costs and time which are necessary in the light of the rising demand for democratic participation amongst citizens. Social implications: More realistic estimates can help to reduce the significant distortion at the beginning of infrastructure projects. Originality/value: We are among the first who use the RCF to estimate the costs in Germany. Furthermore, the hyperbolic discounting function is added as a further theoretical explanation for cost underestimation.

وصف الملف: electronic

الوصول الحر: https://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:kth:diva-284051Test
https://doi.org/10.1108/JPIF-11-2019-0144Test
https://kth.diva-portal.org/smash/get/diva2:1476162/FULLTEXT01.pdfTest

المؤلفون: Steininger, Bertram I., Groth, Martin, Weber, Brigitte L.

المصدر: Journal of Property Investment & Finance. 39(3):256-282

مصطلحات موضوعية: Social Sciences, Economics and Business, Economics, Samhällsvetenskap, Ekonomi och näringsliv, Nationalekonomi, Cost overrun, time overrun, infrastructure, reference class forecasting, hyperbolic discounting, principal-agent theory, Urban and Regional Studies, Urbana och regionala studier, Fastigheter och byggande, Real Estate and Construction Management

الوصف: Purpose: We investigate causes for the cost overrun and delay of the railway project Stuttgart 21. Besides, we try to forecast the actual costs and completion date at an early stage.Design/methodology/approach: The results of exploratory research show the causes for the cost overrun and delay of Stuttgart 21; we compare our findings with other railway projects. To estimate the costs at an early stage, the reference class forecasting (RCF) model is applied; to estimate the time, we apply an OLS regression.Findings: We find that the following causes are relevant for the cost overrun and delay of Stuttgart 21: scope changes, geological conditions, high risk-taking propensity, extended implementation, price overshoot, conflict of interests and lack of citizens' participation. The current estimated costs are within our 95% confidence interval based on RCF; our time forecast underestimates or substantially overestimates the duration actually required.Research limitations/implications: A limitation of our approach is the low number of comparable projects which are available.Practical implications: The use of hyperbolic function or stepwise exponential discount function can help to give a clearer picture of the costs and benefits. The straightforward use of the RFC for costs and OLS for time should motivate more decision-makers to estimate the actual costs and time which are necessary in the light of the rising demand for democratic participation amongst citizens.Social implications: More realistic estimates can help to reduce the significant distortion at the beginning of infrastructure projects.Originality/value: We are among the first who use the RCF to estimate the costs in Germany. Furthermore, the hyperbolic discounting function is added as a further theoretical explanation for cost underestimation.

وصف الملف: electronic

الوصول الحر: http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:kth:diva-325633Test
http://kth.diva-portal.org/smash/get/diva2:1749543/FULLTEXT01.pdfTest

المؤلفون: Knox, Brian

المصدر: Pacific Accounting Review, 2021, Vol. 34, Issue 1, pp. 1-22.

الوصول الحر: http://www.emeraldinsight.com/doi/10.1108/PAR-09-2020-0129Test