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1مؤتمر
المؤلفون: Boufaied, Jed, Le Hénaff, Jean, Le Cadre, Hélène
المساهمون: Integrated Optimization with Complex Structure (INOCS), Inria Lille - Nord Europe, Institut National de Recherche en Informatique et en Automatique (Inria)-Institut National de Recherche en Informatique et en Automatique (Inria)-Université libre de Bruxelles (ULB)-Centre de Recherche en Informatique, Signal et Automatique de Lille - UMR 9189 (CRIStAL), Centrale Lille-Université de Lille-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)-Centrale Lille-Université de Lille-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS), CEA/DAM Arpajon (CEA/DAM), Direction des Applications Militaires (DAM), Commissariat à l'énergie atomique et aux énergies alternatives (CEA)-Commissariat à l'énergie atomique et aux énergies alternatives (CEA)
المصدر: ROADEF 2024 ; https://inria.hal.science/hal-04490283Test ; ROADEF 2024, Mar 2024, Amiens, France
مصطلحات موضوعية: Security Game, Nash Equilibrium, Coercivity, Equilibrium Learning, Partial Equilibrium Model, Security Game Nash Equilibrium Coercivity Equilibrium Learning Partial Equilibrium Model, [INFO.INFO-GT]Computer Science [cs]/Computer Science and Game Theory [cs.GT]
الوصف: National audience ; The primary goal of Nations is to maximize their perceived security, which requires eachNation to develop an effective deterrence strategy [1]. In classical game theoretic models, deterrenceas a military strategy is based upon a standard, iterated two-player prisoner’s dilemmamodel by which cooperation can be assured if a rational player understands the punishmentor cost of defection [2].However, many of the actions taken by Nations in pursuit of the maximization of theirperceived security might, in turn, lead to a decrease rather than an increase in their perceivedsecurity. This dilemma is explained by the fact that the increase in military capability of oneNation might be interpreted as a risk that the arming Nation will use it to perform an attackin the future.In this context, in order to re-establish the balance of power, the other Nations could eitherincrease their own military capabilities or initiate a preemptive strike. Choosing the first optionmay result in a security spiral, in which several Nations are tied in an arms race, and maylead to war in the long run. Such a situation is known as the security dilemma [3], and is onepossible outcome of arms race models.If the goal of game-theoretic models is to quantify the outcomes of situations of conflictbetween armed Nations, non-proliferation policies and containment treaties are often designedwith the goal to stabilize the rivalry between Nations and reduce strategic risks.
العلاقة: hal-04490283; https://inria.hal.science/hal-04490283Test; https://inria.hal.science/hal-04490283/documentTest; https://inria.hal.science/hal-04490283/file/ROADEF_2024__mode%CC%80le_de_document_LaTeX.pdfTest
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2مؤتمر
المؤلفون: Boufaied, Jed, Le Hénaff, Jean, Le Cadre, Hélène
المساهمون: Integrated Optimization with Complex Structure (INOCS), Inria Lille - Nord Europe, Institut National de Recherche en Informatique et en Automatique (Inria)-Institut National de Recherche en Informatique et en Automatique (Inria)-Université libre de Bruxelles (ULB)-Centre de Recherche en Informatique, Signal et Automatique de Lille - UMR 9189 (CRIStAL), Centrale Lille-Université de Lille-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)-Centrale Lille-Université de Lille-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS), CEA/DAM Arpajon (CEA/DAM), Direction des Applications Militaires (DAM), Commissariat à l'énergie atomique et aux énergies alternatives (CEA)-Commissariat à l'énergie atomique et aux énergies alternatives (CEA)
المصدر: ROADEF 2024 ; https://inria.hal.science/hal-04490283Test ; ROADEF 2024, Mar 2024, Amiens, France
مصطلحات موضوعية: Security Game, Nash Equilibrium, Coercivity, Equilibrium Learning, Partial Equilibrium Model, Security Game Nash Equilibrium Coercivity Equilibrium Learning Partial Equilibrium Model, [INFO.INFO-GT]Computer Science [cs]/Computer Science and Game Theory [cs.GT]
الوصف: National audience ; The primary goal of Nations is to maximize their perceived security, which requires eachNation to develop an effective deterrence strategy [1]. In classical game theoretic models, deterrenceas a military strategy is based upon a standard, iterated two-player prisoner’s dilemmamodel by which cooperation can be assured if a rational player understands the punishmentor cost of defection [2].However, many of the actions taken by Nations in pursuit of the maximization of theirperceived security might, in turn, lead to a decrease rather than an increase in their perceivedsecurity. This dilemma is explained by the fact that the increase in military capability of oneNation might be interpreted as a risk that the arming Nation will use it to perform an attackin the future.In this context, in order to re-establish the balance of power, the other Nations could eitherincrease their own military capabilities or initiate a preemptive strike. Choosing the first optionmay result in a security spiral, in which several Nations are tied in an arms race, and maylead to war in the long run. Such a situation is known as the security dilemma [3], and is onepossible outcome of arms race models.If the goal of game-theoretic models is to quantify the outcomes of situations of conflictbetween armed Nations, non-proliferation policies and containment treaties are often designedwith the goal to stabilize the rivalry between Nations and reduce strategic risks.
العلاقة: hal-04490283; https://inria.hal.science/hal-04490283Test; https://inria.hal.science/hal-04490283/documentTest; https://inria.hal.science/hal-04490283/file/ROADEF_2024__mode%CC%80le_de_document_LaTeX.pdfTest
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3تقرير
المؤلفون: Le Hénaff, Jean, Boufaied, Jed, Le Cadre, Hélène
المساهمون: CEA/DAM Arpajon (CEA/DAM), Direction des Applications Militaires (DAM), Commissariat à l'énergie atomique et aux énergies alternatives (CEA)-Commissariat à l'énergie atomique et aux énergies alternatives (CEA), Centre de Recherche en Informatique, Signal et Automatique de Lille - UMR 9189 (CRIStAL), Centrale Lille-Université de Lille-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS), Integrated Optimization with Complex Structure (INOCS), Inria Lille - Nord Europe, Institut National de Recherche en Informatique et en Automatique (Inria)-Institut National de Recherche en Informatique et en Automatique (Inria)-Université libre de Bruxelles (ULB)-Centre de Recherche en Informatique, Signal et Automatique de Lille - UMR 9189 (CRIStAL), Centrale Lille-Université de Lille-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)-Centrale Lille-Université de Lille-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)
المصدر: https://inria.hal.science/hal-04411599Test ; 2024.
مصطلحات موضوعية: Security Game, Nash Equilibrium, Uniform Coercivity, Learning in Games, Stability, [MATH.MATH-OC]Mathematics [math]/Optimization and Control [math.OC]
الوصف: We formulate a security game in a context of mixed armament acquisition, involving a finite set of Nations in strategic relationship, with utility functions which are nonlinear and non-differentiable on the boundary of their sets of definition. Since we want to study the long-term effect of the Nations' investment in nuclear weapons, we focus on the steady-state analysis of the game. This requires us to extend the classical results from Rosen on compact-concave games, to unbounded concave games, relying on the uniform coercivity property of the Nations' utility functions. In addition, we prove the existence and uniqueness, under mild assumptions, of an interior point Nash Equilibrium solution of the game. To learn the interior point Nash Equilibrium, we provide a decentralized proximal point-type algorithm, and derive a closed form expression of its convergence rate. Simulations are performed in case of a duopoly, illustrating the utility improvement and stabilizing effects of nuclear armaments, by comparison with the conventional-only setting. We subsequently generalize this result to an arbitrarily large, but finite, number of Nations. The problem is extended further by allowing arms trades between Nations, split into suppliers on the one side, and recipients-interpreted as opponents-on the other side. It is widely recognized that arms trades can have negative externalities on the supplier Nations' security, and there are benefits to cooperate. Forming an export coalition enables the socialization of the operational costs among the coalition members and reallocation according to an ex-post cost allocation mechanism, while ensuring the maximization of the sum of the coalition members' security functions. For a given coalition structure, we develop a partial equilibrium model of the international arms market. We prove the existence and uniqueness of a market equilibrium in arms trade prices and supply. Finally, we derive conditions on the exports, arms trade prices, and cost allocation mechanism guaranteeing the ...
العلاقة: hal-04411599; https://inria.hal.science/hal-04411599Test; https://inria.hal.science/hal-04411599/documentTest; https://inria.hal.science/hal-04411599/file/On_Stability_of_Nonlinear_Armsbuilding_Security_Games.pdfTest
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4تقرير
المؤلفون: Le Hénaff, Jean, Boufaied, Jed, Le Cadre, Hélène
المساهمون: CEA/DAM Arpajon (CEA/DAM), Direction des Applications Militaires (DAM), Commissariat à l'énergie atomique et aux énergies alternatives (CEA)-Commissariat à l'énergie atomique et aux énergies alternatives (CEA), Centre de Recherche en Informatique, Signal et Automatique de Lille - UMR 9189 (CRIStAL), Centrale Lille-Université de Lille-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS), Integrated Optimization with Complex Structure (INOCS), Inria Lille - Nord Europe, Institut National de Recherche en Informatique et en Automatique (Inria)-Institut National de Recherche en Informatique et en Automatique (Inria)-Université libre de Bruxelles (ULB)-Centre de Recherche en Informatique, Signal et Automatique de Lille - UMR 9189 (CRIStAL), Centrale Lille-Université de Lille-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)-Centrale Lille-Université de Lille-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)
المصدر: https://inria.hal.science/hal-04411599Test ; 2024.
مصطلحات موضوعية: Security Game, Nash Equilibrium, Uniform Coercivity, Learning in Games, Stability, [MATH.MATH-OC]Mathematics [math]/Optimization and Control [math.OC]
الوصف: We formulate a security game in a context of mixed armament acquisition, involving a finite set of Nations in strategic relationship, with utility functions which are nonlinear and non-differentiable on the boundary of their sets of definition. Since we want to study the long-term effect of the Nations' investment in nuclear weapons, we focus on the steady-state analysis of the game. This requires us to extend the classical results from Rosen on compact-concave games, to unbounded concave games, relying on the uniform coercivity property of the Nations' utility functions. In addition, we prove the existence and uniqueness, under mild assumptions, of an interior point Nash Equilibrium solution of the game. To learn the interior point Nash Equilibrium, we provide a decentralized proximal point-type algorithm, and derive a closed form expression of its convergence rate. Simulations are performed in case of a duopoly, illustrating the utility improvement and stabilizing effects of nuclear armaments, by comparison with the conventional-only setting. We subsequently generalize this result to an arbitrarily large, but finite, number of Nations. The problem is extended further by allowing arms trades between Nations, split into suppliers on the one side, and recipients-interpreted as opponents-on the other side. It is widely recognized that arms trades can have negative externalities on the supplier Nations' security, and there are benefits to cooperate. Forming an export coalition enables the socialization of the operational costs among the coalition members and reallocation according to an ex-post cost allocation mechanism, while ensuring the maximization of the sum of the coalition members' security functions. For a given coalition structure, we develop a partial equilibrium model of the international arms market. We prove the existence and uniqueness of a market equilibrium in arms trade prices and supply. Finally, we derive conditions on the exports, arms trade prices, and cost allocation mechanism guaranteeing the ...
العلاقة: hal-04411599; https://inria.hal.science/hal-04411599Test; https://inria.hal.science/hal-04411599/documentTest; https://inria.hal.science/hal-04411599/file/On_Stability_of_Nonlinear_Armsbuilding_Security_Games.pdfTest
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5تقرير
المؤلفون: Le Hénaff, Jean, Boufaied, Jed, Le Cadre, Hélène
المساهمون: CEA/DAM Arpajon (CEA/DAM), Centre de Recherche en Informatique, Signal et Automatique de Lille - UMR 9189 (CRIStAL), Centrale Lille-Université de Lille-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS), Integrated Optimization with Complex Structure (INOCS), Inria Lille - Nord Europe, Institut National de Recherche en Informatique et en Automatique (Inria)-Institut National de Recherche en Informatique et en Automatique (Inria)-Université libre de Bruxelles (ULB)-Centre de Recherche en Informatique, Signal et Automatique de Lille - UMR 9189 (CRIStAL), Centrale Lille-Université de Lille-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)-Centrale Lille-Université de Lille-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)
المصدر: https://inria.hal.science/hal-04411599Test ; 2024.
مصطلحات موضوعية: Security Game, Nash Equilibrium, Uniform Coercivity, Learning in Games, Stability, [MATH.MATH-OC]Mathematics [math]/Optimization and Control [math.OC]
الوصف: We formulate a security game in a context of mixed armament acquisition, involving a finite set of Nations in strategic relationship, with utility functions which are nonlinear and non-differentiable on the boundary of their sets of definition. Since we want to study the long-term effect of the Nations' investment in nuclear weapons, we focus on the steady-state analysis of the game. This requires us to extend the classical results from Rosen on compact-concave games, to unbounded concave games, relying on the uniform coercivity property of the Nations' utility functions. In addition, we prove the existence and uniqueness, under mild assumptions, of an interior point Nash Equilibrium solution of the game. To learn the interior point Nash Equilibrium, we provide a decentralized proximal point-type algorithm, and derive a closed form expression of its convergence rate. Simulations are performed in case of a duopoly, illustrating the utility improvement and stabilizing effects of nuclear armaments, by comparison with the conventional-only setting. We subsequently generalize this result to an arbitrarily large, but finite, number of Nations. The problem is extended further by allowing arms trades between Nations, split into suppliers on the one side, and recipients-interpreted as opponents-on the other side. It is widely recognized that arms trades can have negative externalities on the supplier Nations' security, and there are benefits to cooperate. Forming an export coalition enables the socialization of the operational costs among the coalition members and reallocation according to an ex-post cost allocation mechanism, while ensuring the maximization of the sum of the coalition members' security functions. For a given coalition structure, we develop a partial equilibrium model of the international arms market. We prove the existence and uniqueness of a market equilibrium in arms trade prices and supply. Finally, we derive conditions on the exports, arms trade prices, and cost allocation mechanism guaranteeing the ...
العلاقة: hal-04411599; https://inria.hal.science/hal-04411599Test; https://inria.hal.science/hal-04411599/documentTest; https://inria.hal.science/hal-04411599/file/On_Stability_of_Nonlinear_Armsbuilding_Security_Games.pdfTest
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6
المؤلفون: Le Hénaff, Jean, Boufaied, Jed, Le Cadre, Hélène
المساهمون: CEA/DAM Arpajon CEA/DAM, Centre de Recherche en Informatique, Signal et Automatique de Lille - UMR 9189 CRIStAL, Integrated Optimization with Complex Structure INOCS
مصطلحات موضوعية: Security Game, Nash Equilibrium, Uniform Coercivity, Learning in Games, Stability
الوصف: We formulate a security game in a context of mixed armament acquisition, involving a finite set of Nations in strategic relationship, with utility functions which are nonlinear and non-differentiable on the boundary of their sets of definition. Since we want to study the long-term effect of the Nations' investment in nuclear weapons, we focus on the steady-state analysis of the game. This requires us to extend the classical results from Rosen on compact-concave games, to unbounded concave games, relying on the uniform coercivity property of the Nations' utility functions. In addition, we prove the existence and uniqueness, under mild assumptions, of an interior point Nash Equilibrium solution of the game. To learn the interior point Nash Equilibrium, we provide a decentralized proximal point-type algorithm, and derive a closed form expression of its convergence rate. Simulations are performed in case of a duopoly, illustrating the utility improvement and stabilizing effects of nuclear armaments, by comparison with the conventional-only setting. We subsequently generalize this result to an arbitrarily large, but finite, number of Nations. The problem is extended further by allowing arms trades between Nations, split into suppliers on the one side, and recipients-interpreted as opponents-on the other side. It is widely recognized that arms trades can have negative externalities on the supplier Nations' security, and there are benefits to cooperate. Forming an export coalition enables the socialization of the operational costs among the coalition members and reallocation according to an ex-post cost allocation mechanism, while ensuring the maximization of the sum of the coalition members' security functions. For a given coalition structure, we develop a partial equilibrium model of the international arms market. We prove the existence and uniqueness of a market equilibrium in arms trade prices and supply. Finally, we derive conditions on the exports, arms trade prices, and cost allocation mechanism guaranteeing the ...
وصف الملف: application/octet-stream
