المؤلفون: Zhiping Xie

المصدر: SSRN Electronic Journal.

مصطلحات موضوعية: TheoryofComputation_MISCELLANEOUS, Competition (economics), Microeconomics, symbols.namesake, Matching market, Sequential game, Nash equilibrium, Social cooperation, Fiat money, symbols, Economics, Perfect competition, Monetary economics

الوصف: Kiyotaki-Wright (1991, 1993) ensured fiat money’s essentiality; but they abstract competition away. Therefore, Lagos-Wright (2005) added a frictionless centralized market to their model; however, their method should be improved. This paper directly substitutes perfectly competitive decentralized markets for the randomly matching market to resolve the competition problem. Under a temporary equilibrium framework, it constructs a dynamic game model where agents choose strategies to determine their prediction functions of future nominal prices with respect to past nominal prices. It proves that a combination of the agents’ strategies to fully accept fiat money cooperatively – to avoid tremendous friction – is a Nash Equilibrium.

الوصول الحر: https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::d41fefe1187ff86fa05f01c14350b451Test
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2050751Test

المؤلفون: Zhiping Xie

المصدر: SSRN Electronic Journal.

مصطلحات موضوعية: symbols.namesake, Endogenous money, Sequential game, Nash equilibrium, Financial transaction, Fiat money, Money measurement concept, Money illusion, symbols, Economics, Purchasing power, TheoryofComputation_GENERAL, Monetary economics

الوصف: This paper addresses firstly why people have to use fiat money and then why they are rationally willing to accept it from the perspective of general equilibrium by using dynamic game to determine agents' expectation of its purchasing power in unrevealed future. Its model formulates the process that agents determine fiat money's nominal value in an infinite-time decentralized sequence economy where agents use fiat money to bridge markets to avoid huge transaction cost. It is proved that all agents' accepting fiat money with expectation of unchanged nominal value of it is Nash equilibrium so as to guarantee fiat money's essentiality.

الوصول الحر: https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::68ae067e75fec8eadae11786b6f97d1dTest
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1857282Test

المؤلفون: Zhiping Xie

المصدر: SSRN Electronic Journal.

مصطلحات موضوعية: TheoryofComputation_MISCELLANEOUS, Transaction cost, Endogenous money, General equilibrium theory, Partial equilibrium, Fiat money, TheoryofComputation_GENERAL, Monetary economics, Microeconomics, symbols.namesake, Nash equilibrium, Money illusion, symbols, Economics, Game theory

الوصف: In an infinite-time decentralized sequence economy, agents use fiat money to bridge markets as if they make trades in a centralized economy, to avoid huge transaction cost that all agents’ going together must incur. The model in this paper formulates the process how agents decide the fiat money’s nominal value. Three new concepts are suggested – plan of choices, Temporarily Partial Equilibrium and Intra-Date Equilibrium; and this paper proves the existence of these two equilibriums. Then, based on the equilibrium prices and allocations of the corresponding infinite-time Walrasian economy, this paper proves that all agents’ accepting fiat money with unchanged nominal value is a Nash equilibrium, which guarantees fiat money’s essentiality.

الوصول الحر: https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::0cb492d97b1be70673b6b01feb13831eTest
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1767565Test

المؤلفون: Zhiping Xie

المصدر: SSRN Electronic Journal.

مصطلحات موضوعية: Transaction cost, symbols.namesake, Endogenous money, Sequential game, General equilibrium theory, Process (engineering), Nash equilibrium, Fiat money, symbols, Competitive economy, Economics, TheoryofComputation_GENERAL, Monetary economics

الوصف: This paper mainly addresses why people are rationally willing to cooperate with one another to accept fiat money from the perspective of decentralized sequential general equilibrium framework by using dynamic game to determine agents’ expectation of nominal prices in unrevealed future. The model formulates the process that agents determine fiat money’s nominal value competitively in an infinite-time decentralized sequence economy where agents use fiat money to bridge markets to avoid the huge transaction cost. It is proved that all agents’ expectation with fiat money’s unchanged nominal value is self-fulfilling with a Nash Equilibrium so as to guarantee fiat money’s essentiality.

الوصول الحر: https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::d9f361558a1009ec600e6eea53e71169Test
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1935730Test

المؤلفون: Zhiping Xie

المصدر: SSRN Electronic Journal.

مصطلحات موضوعية: Transaction cost, education.field_of_study, General equilibrium theory, Population, Social Welfare, Walrasian auction, Supply and demand, Microeconomics, symbols.namesake, Nash equilibrium, symbols, Economics, Fraction (mathematics), education

الوصف: The functional relationships between the price vector and consumer's Marshallian demand and/or producer's optimal actual sale will be directly revealed respectively by two new geometric methods in general equilibrium framework without storage. The impact of transaction cost shared by individual on these functional relationships will be directly analyzed. Then, it is proved that, the demand and supply functions of different commodities will be no longer mathematically continuous, if there is a special kind of transaction cost independent of what are traded, which is mainly caused by information cost. This makes sure that the transaction cost will substantially disturb the Walrasian equilibrium without storage if non-infinitesimal fraction of population synchronously shift their decisions. And then, it is else suggested that transaction cost will dramatically cut down social welfare. Finally, a revised model with storage as a theoretic way out for Walrasian economy of zero-storage will be presented to suggest that a competitive economy with zero-storage probably isn't at Nash equilibrium.

الوصول الحر: https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::16c86d16b5ca2a6991016781aa6120e0Test
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.415241Test