التفاصيل البيبلوغرافية
| العنوان: |
IMF’s assistance: Devil’s kiss or guardian angel? |
| المؤلفون: |
Brandes, J.1, Schüle, Tobias2 tobias.schuele@uni-tuebingen.de |
| المصدر: |
Journal of Economics. May2008, Vol. 94 Issue 1, p63-86. 24p. 1 Graph. |
| مصطلحات موضوعية: |
*FINANCE, *GLOBALIZATION, *FINANCIAL management, *LIQUIDITY (Economics), CATALYSTS |
| الشركة/الكيان: |
INTERNATIONAL Monetary Fund 069275188 |
| مستخلص: |
This paper contributes to the debate on the efficacy of IMF’s catalytic finance in preventing financial crises. Extending Morris and Shin (J Int Econ 70: 161–177, 2006), we consider that the IMF’s intervention policy usually exerts a signaling effect on private creditors and that several interventions in sequence may be necessary to avert an impending crisis. Without the IMF’s signaling ability, our results state that repeated intervention is required to bail out a country, whereby additional assistance may induce moral hazard on the debtor side. Contrarily, if the IMF exerts a strong signaling effect, one single intervention suffices to avoid liquidity crises. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR] |
|
Copyright of Journal of Economics is the property of Springer Nature and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.) |
| قاعدة البيانات: |
Business Source Index |
Full Text Finder