Two-sided matching with interdependent values
| العنوان: | Two-sided matching with interdependent values |
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| المؤلفون: | Archishman Chakraborty, Alessandro Citanna, Michael Ostrovsky |
| المساهمون: | Groupement de Recherche et d'Etudes en Gestion à HEC (GREGH), Ecole des Hautes Etudes Commerciales (HEC Paris)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS) |
| المصدر: | Journal of Economic Theory Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, 2010, 145 (1), pp.85-105. ⟨10.1016/j.jet.2009.07.004⟩ |
| بيانات النشر: | HAL CCSD, 2010. |
| سنة النشر: | 2010 |
| مصطلحات موضوعية: | Economics and Econometrics, Matching market, Matching (statistics), media_common.quotation_subject, Stability (learning theory), Interdependent values, JEL: C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods/C.C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory/C.C7.C78 - Bargaining Theory • Matching Theory, Interdependent valuations, Interdependence, Complete information, [SHS.ECO.ECO]Humanities and Social Sciences/Economics and Finance/domain_shs.eco.eco, Econometrics, ComputingMilieux_COMPUTERSANDEDUCATION, Matching, Stability, JEL: D - Microeconomics/D.D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty/D.D8.D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information • Mechanism Design, Mathematics, media_common |
| الوصف: | We introduce and study two-sided matching with incomplete information and interdependent valuations on one side of the market. An example of such a setting is a matching market between colleges and students in which colleges receive partially informative signals about students. Stability in such markets depends on the amount of information about matchings available to colleges. When colleges observe the entire matching, a stable matching mechanism does not generally exist. When colleges observe only their own matches, a stable mechanism exists if students have identical preferences over colleges, but may not exist if students have different preferences. |
| اللغة: | English |
| تدمد: | 0022-0531 1095-7235 |
| الوصول الحر: | https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::8067a9e5304d124520406e45cfd0ff2bTest https://hal-hec.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-00463247Test |
| حقوق: | CLOSED |
| رقم الانضمام: | edsair.doi.dedup.....8067a9e5304d124520406e45cfd0ff2b |
| قاعدة البيانات: | OpenAIRE |
| تدمد: | 00220531 10957235 |
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