Dynamic Monetary Equilibrium in a Random Matching Economy
| العنوان: | Dynamic Monetary Equilibrium in a Random Matching Economy |
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| المؤلفون: | Edward J. Green, Ruilin Zhou |
| المصدر: | BASE-Bielefeld Academic Search Engine |
| بيانات النشر: | The Econometric Society, 2002. |
| سنة النشر: | 2002 |
| مصطلحات موضوعية: | Economics and Econometrics, Coincidence of wants, Economy, Fiat money, Economics, Double auction, Price level, Pairwise comparison, Market power, Relative price, Indeterminacy (literature) |
| الوصف: | This article concerns an infinite horizon economy where trade must occur pairwise, using a double auction mechanism, and where fiat money overcomes lack of double coincidence of wants. Traders are anonymous and lack market power. Goods are divisible and perishable, and are consumed at every date. Preferences are defined by utility-stream overtaking. Money is divisible and not subject to inventory constraints. The evolution of individual and economywide money holdings distributions is characterized. There is a welfare-ordered continuum of single price equilibria, reflecting indeterminacy of the price level rather than of relative prices. |
| تدمد: | 1468-0262 0012-9682 |
| الوصول الحر: | https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::a58296d069b707b9ac268ac1d7ddfe8bTest https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-0262.00315Test |
| حقوق: | OPEN |
| رقم الانضمام: | edsair.doi.dedup.....a58296d069b707b9ac268ac1d7ddfe8b |
| قاعدة البيانات: | OpenAIRE |
| تدمد: | 14680262 00129682 |
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