| الوصف: |
This thesis contains three essays on corporate financial transactions when there is asymmetric information between firms and investors. In the first essay, "Security Design under Common-Value Competition", I show common-value competition drives informed investors to propose debt financing, because debt protects them against the winner's curse. The information sensitiveness of investors' securities is positively related to their market power. Among different aspects of market power, monopolistic power is the primary determinant. In the second essay, "Security Design with Two-Sided Asymmetric Information", I study a model in which a firm organizes a security-bid auction when both the firm and investors have private information. In equilibrium, the firm cannot credibly reveal its private valuation by security design, and requires payments in the most information-sensitive security family regardless of its valuation. In the third essay, "Share Issues versus Share Repurchases", Philip Bond, Hongda Zhong and I study firms' share issues and repurchases in a unified framework with the informational friction that firms have superior information to investors. We find asymmetric outcomes of issue and repurchase methods: firms separate on different issue methods, but pool on the most efficient repurchase method. Moreover, firms use more efficient issue methods when raising larger amounts of capital. Both results are consistent with empirical evidences in the literature. |
