دورية أكاديمية
Executive overconfidence and securities class actions
العنوان: | Executive overconfidence and securities class actions |
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المؤلفون: | BANERJEE, Suman, HUMPHERY-JENNER, Mark, NANDA, Vikram, THAM, T. Mandy |
المصدر: | Research Collection Lee Kong Chian School Of Business |
بيانات النشر: | Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University |
سنة النشر: | 2018 |
المجموعة: | Institutional Knowledge (InK) at Singapore Management University |
مصطلحات موضوعية: | CEO Overconfidence, Team Overconfidence, Securities Class Actions, Governance, Finance, Finance and Financial Management |
الوصف: | Overconfident CEOs/senior executives tend to have excessively positive views of their own skills and their company’s future performance. We hypothesize that overconfident managers are more likely to engage in reckless or intentional actions/disclosures that give rise to securities class actions (SCAs). Empirical evidence is supportive: Overconfident CEOs/senior executives increase SCA likelihood, though litigation risk is ameliorated through improved governance, such as following the Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002. Post-SCA, companies are less likely to hire an overconfident CEO. Following an SCA, overconfident CEOs appear to moderate behavior and to reduce their litigation risk. |
نوع الوثيقة: | text |
وصف الملف: | application/pdf |
اللغة: | English |
العلاقة: | https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/lkcsb_research/5979Test; https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/lkcsb_research/article/6978/viewcontent/SSRN_id2436264.pdfTest |
DOI: | 10.1017/S0022109018001291 |
الإتاحة: | https://doi.org/10.1017/S0022109018001291Test https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/lkcsb_research/5979Test https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/lkcsb_research/article/6978/viewcontent/SSRN_id2436264.pdfTest |
حقوق: | http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0Test/ |
رقم الانضمام: | edsbas.E7C5070C |
قاعدة البيانات: | BASE |
DOI: | 10.1017/S0022109018001291 |
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