المؤلفون: Ian A. Hiskens, Xiangdong Liu, Zhongjing Ma, Suli Zou

المصدر: IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control. 62:2374-2389

مصطلحات موضوعية: TheoryofComputation_MISCELLANEOUS, Computer Science::Computer Science and Game Theory, 0209 industrial biotechnology, Generalized second-price auction, Mathematical optimization, Auction theory, 020209 energy, TheoryofComputation_GENERAL, 02 engineering and technology, Auction algorithm, Walrasian auction, Computer Science Applications, Revenue equivalence, symbols.namesake, 020901 industrial engineering & automation, Control and Systems Engineering, Nash equilibrium, Incentive compatibility, 0202 electrical engineering, electronic engineering, information engineering, symbols, Electrical and Electronic Engineering, Mathematical economics, Game theory

الوصف: A novel class of auction-based games is formulated to study coordination problems arising from charging a population of electric vehicles (EVs) over a finite horizon. To compete for energy allocation over the horizon, each individual EV submits a multidimensional bid, with the dimension equal to two times the number of time-steps in the horizon. Use of the progressive second price (PSP) auction mechanism ensures that incentive compatibility holds for the auction games. However, due to the cross elasticity of EVs over the charging horizon, the marginal valuation of an individual EV at a particular time is determined by both the demand at that time and the total demand over the entire horizon. This difficulty is addressed by partitioning the allowable set of bid profiles based on the total desired energy over the entire horizon. It is shown that the efficient bid profile over the charging horizon is a Nash equilibrium of the underlying auction game. An update mechanism for the auction game is designed. A numerical example demonstrates that the auction process converges to an efficient Nash equilibrium. The auction-based charging coordination scheme is adapted to a receding horizon formulation to account for disturbances and forecast uncertainty.

الوصول الحر: https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::b9efdc7b829c5d109d8be18ee461c990Test
https://doi.org/10.1109/tac.2016.2614106Test

المؤلفون: M. Nazif Faqiry, Sanjoy Das

المصدر: IEEE Access, Vol 4, Pp 3794-3805 (2016)

مصطلحات موضوعية: TheoryofComputation_MISCELLANEOUS, Mathematical optimization, General Computer Science, auction, Auction theory, Computer science, 020209 energy, 02 engineering and technology, Proportionally fair, trading, 0202 electrical engineering, electronic engineering, information engineering, Revenue, General Materials Science, Generalized second-price auction, General Engineering, TheoryofComputation_GENERAL, Energy grid, Auction algorithm, Walrasian auction, agents, Revenue equivalence, microgrid, aggregator, lcsh:Electrical engineering. Electronics. Nuclear engineering, Microgrid, lcsh:TK1-9971

الوصف: This paper investigates the problem of proportionally fair double-sided energy auction involving buying and selling agents. The grid is assumed to be operating under islanded mode. A distributed auction algorithm that can be implemented by an aggregator, as well as a possible approach by which the agents may approximate price anticipation is considered. Equilibrium conditions arising due to price anticipation is analyzed. A modified auction to mitigate the resulting loss in efficiency due to such behavior is suggested. This modified auction allows the aggregate social welfare of the agents to be arbitrarily close to that attainable with price taking agents. Next, equilibrium conditions when the aggregator collects a surcharge price per unit of energy traded is examined. A bi-objective optimization problem is identified that takes into account both the agents' social welfare as well as the aggregator's revenue from the surcharge. The results of extensive simulations, which corroborate the theoretical analysis, are reported.

الوصول الحر: https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::822b49b4594f571b9a0f60e971c1de93Test
https://doi.org/10.1109/access.2016.2591912Test

المؤلفون: German Caicedo, Hugh Rudnick, Enzo Sauma

المصدر: IEEE Latin America Transactions. 12:609-617

مصطلحات موضوعية: Revenue equivalence, Microeconomics, Reverse auction, Forward auction, General Computer Science, Auction theory, Demand curve, Dutch auction, Eauction, Business, Electrical and Electronic Engineering, Walrasian auction

الوصف: Electricity contracts are long-term supply assurance mechanism still in critical conditions, encourage competition and mitigate the risk of price volatility. However, it is necessary to evaluate design alternatives that balance contracts market versus expectations of the producers and the planner and/or regulator of the system. In this paper an international referencing is made, the formation of long-term price is analyzed, as well as market risks and their management. It implements a market simulation model, applying auction theory and descending clock auction. Contracting strategies are simulated, with product sensitivities, clearance mechanism, supply restriction and payment allocation, considering also the expectation of the buyer. For this, the demand function is estimated, the willingness to pay, and the maximum offer utility by sub-optimal allocations of opportunity cost and efficient frontier. Results show that the descending auction clears at more suitable prices against closed envelope auction and promotes competition under certain characteristics of the demand function. Best results are obtained with a standardized product, but in blocks of no more than 1% of the amount auctioned. A larger size creates infeasible solutions, increasing the closing price that contrasts when considering a supply pivotal constraint, obtaining lower closing prices. The proposed method offers a more suitable solution regarding intervention or handling mechanisms of the demand function.

الوصول الحر: https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::a62b142ba441a1a8096f627e6904306aTest
https://doi.org/10.1109/tla.2014.6868862Test

المؤلفون: Hongseok Kim, Marina Thottan

المصدر: Bell Labs Technical Journal. 16:101-107

مصطلحات موضوعية: Microeconomics, Supply, Scalability, Stackelberg competition, Price elasticity of supply, Business, Microgrid, Electrical and Electronic Engineering, Bidding, Walrasian auction, Profit (economics)

الوصف: In this paper, we propose a market model where microgrids sell their surplus power to a utility via aggregators. This is a scalable model where a utility does not directly interact with a large number of microgrids. Thus, aggregators collect power from microgrids and resell it to the utility. From the microgrids' perspective, aggregators are buyers. From the utility's perspective, aggregators are sellers. In this context, based on the two-stage Stackelberg game, we show how to achieve efficient market equilibrium using the tatonnement process and supply function bidding. We also show that the participation of aggregators may significantly affect the market depending on the supply elasticity of microgrids, which in turn depends on the cost structure of microgrids. For example, when the cost function of microgrids is roughly linear, the aggregators may not make a profit. However, if the cost function of microgrids has a higher order term, aggregators may accumulate a large profit, which potentially raises the issue of the regulator's role in the market.

الوصول الحر: https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::b8e0492c7d69199fa38142ee48760f41Test
https://doi.org/10.1002/bltj.20524Test

المؤلفون: Benjamin Armbruster, Yao Xie, Yinyu Ye

المصدر: IEEE Transactions on Signal Processing. 58:2442-2446

مصطلحات موضوعية: Mathematical optimization, Computer science, Competitive equilibrium, Walrasian auction, Radio spectrum, Dynamic spectrum management, Frequency allocation, symbols.namesake, Open market operation, Nash equilibrium, Signal Processing, symbols, Perfect competition, Electrical and Electronic Engineering, Simulation, Data transmission

الوصف: Ye [?Competitive Communication Spectrum Economy and Equilibrium,? 2008, working paper] and Lin [?Budget Allocation in a Competitive Communication Spectrum Economy,? EURASIP J. Adv. Signal Process., Article ID: 963717, vol. 2009, p. 12, Sep. 2009] have shown that dynamic spectrum management (DSM) using the market competitive equilibrium (CE), which sets a price for transmission power on each channel, leads to better system performance in terms of the total data transmission rate (by reducing cross talk), than using the Nash equilibrium (NE). But how to achieve such a CE is an open problem. We show that the CE is the solution of a linear complementarity problem (LCP) and can be computed efficiently. We propose a decentralized tatonnement process for adjusting the prices to achieve a CE. We show that under reasonable conditions, any tatonnement process converges to the CE. The conditions are that users of a channel experience the same noise levels and that the crosstalk effects between users are low-rank and weak.

الوصول الحر: https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::be41d96ce809a73ed5709b28778adf55Test
https://doi.org/10.1109/tsp.2009.2039820Test