Cournot equilibria in two-settlement electricity markets with system contingencies

التفاصيل البيبلوغرافية
العنوان: Cournot equilibria in two-settlement electricity markets with system contingencies
المؤلفون: Shmuel S. Oren, Jian Yao, Ilan Adler
المصدر: International Journal of Critical Infrastructures. 3:142
بيانات النشر: Inderscience Publishers, 2007.
سنة النشر: 2007
مصطلحات موضوعية: Spot contract, General equilibrium theory, Partial equilibrium, Economic surplus, Cournot competition, Microeconomics, symbols.namesake, General Energy, Forward contract, Open market operation, Nash equilibrium, Economics, symbols, Safety, Risk, Reliability and Quality, Mathematical economics, General Environmental Science
الوصف: We study Nash equilibrium in two-settlement competitive electricity markets with horizontal market power, flow congestion, demand uncertainties and probabilistic system contingencies. The equilibrium is formulated as a stochastic Equilibrium Problem with Equilibrium Constraints (EPEC) in which each firm solves a stochastic Mathematical Programme with Equilibrium Constraints (MPEC). We assume a no-arbitrage relationship between the forward prices and the spot prices. We find that, with two settlements, the generation firms have incentives to commit forward contracts, which increase social surplus and decrease spot energy prices. Furthermore, these effects are amplified when the markets become less concentrated.
تدمد: 1741-8038
1475-3219
الوصول الحر: https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::13b88c59c6b82a05c3ccc3a5d012073bTest
https://doi.org/10.1504/ijcis.2007.011549Test
رقم الانضمام: edsair.doi...........13b88c59c6b82a05c3ccc3a5d012073b
قاعدة البيانات: OpenAIRE