دورية أكاديمية
Myopia, Regrets and Risky Behaviors
| العنوان: | Myopia, Regrets and Risky Behaviors |
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| المؤلفون: | Pestieau, Pierre, Ponthière, Grégory |
| المساهمون: | Paris-Jourdan Sciences Economiques (PSE), École normale supérieure - Paris (ENS Paris), Université Paris sciences et lettres (PSL)-Université Paris sciences et lettres (PSL)-Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique (INRA)-École des hautes études en sciences sociales (EHESS)-École des Ponts ParisTech (ENPC)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS), Center of Operation Research and Econometrics Louvain (CORE), Université Catholique de Louvain = Catholic University of Louvain (UCL), Center for Economic Policy Research (CEPR), CEPR, Paris School of Economics (PSE), École des Ponts ParisTech (ENPC)-École normale supérieure - Paris (ENS Paris), Université Paris sciences et lettres (PSL)-Université Paris sciences et lettres (PSL)-Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (UP1)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)-École des hautes études en sciences sociales (EHESS)-Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement (INRAE), Ce travail a bénéficié d'une aide de l'Etat gérée par l'Agence Nationale de la Recherche au titre du programme " Investissements d'avenir " portant la référence ANR-10-LABX-93-01. This work was supported by the French National Research Agency, through the program Investissements d'Avenir, ANR-10--LABX-93-01. |
| المصدر: | Archive Ouverte d'INRAE ; ISSN: 0927-5940 ; EISSN: 1573-6970 ; International Tax and Public Finance ; International Tax and Public Finance, Springer Verlag, 2012, 19 (2), pp.288-317. ⟨10.1007/s10797-011-9188-6⟩ |
| بيانات النشر: | HAL CCSD Springer Verlag Springer New York LLC |
| سنة النشر: | 2012 |
| مصطلحات موضوعية: | Sin goods, Optimal taxation, Myopia, Regrets, Self-control, eco, demo |
| الوصف: | This paper examines how a government should intervene when agents make choices having long-term detrimental effects on their life expectancy. For that purpose, we consider an economy where some agents consume a sin good (reducing their survival chances) out of myopia, and regret their choices later on, whereas other agents make, because of their impatience, the same risky choices, which they never regret. We argue that, in the first-best, a government should only interfere with behaviors that agents will regret, but not with other behaviors. In the second-best, asymmetric information and redistributive concerns imply interferences not only with myopic behaviors, but also with impatience-based (rational) behaviors. Finally, we introduce heterogeneity in individual earnings, and show that the optimal tax on the sin good depends on the size of the myopic group, on the reactivity of sin good consumption to tax changes, and on the extent to which sin good consumption is correlated with labor earnings. |
| نوع الوثيقة: | article in journal/newspaper |
| اللغة: | English |
| العلاقة: | halshs-00754611; PRODINRA: 316567; WOS: 000302286800006; 10670/1.e9xu5q; https://hal-pjse.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-00754611Test |
| DOI: | 10.1007/s10797-011-9188-6 |
| الإتاحة: | https://doi.org/10.1007/s10797-011-9188-6Test https://hal-pjse.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-00754611Test |
| حقوق: | undefined |
| رقم الانضمام: | edsbas.57C7EA5E |
| قاعدة البيانات: | BASE |
| DOI: | 10.1007/s10797-011-9188-6 |
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