Aggregate information, common knowledge, and agreeing not to bet

التفاصيل البيبلوغرافية
العنوان: Aggregate information, common knowledge, and agreeing not to bet
المؤلفون: Tsakas, Elias, 1979
المصدر: Working Papers in Economics (online).
مصطلحات موضوعية: Economics, Nationalekonomi, Gamble, private information, communication, common knowledge, JEL: D81, D82, D84, D89
الوصف: I consider a gamble where the sum of the distributed payoffs is proportionate tothe number of participants. I show that no subset of the population can agreeto participate in the bet, if the size of the group is commonly known. Repeatedannouncements of the number of the participants leads the population to agree notto bet.
الوصول الحر: https://gup.ub.gu.se/publication/43058Test
قاعدة البيانات: SwePub