التفاصيل البيبلوغرافية
| العنوان: |
The political economy of structural reforms under a deficit restriction |
| المؤلفون: |
Poplawski Ribeiro, Marcos1 http://www1.fee.uva.nl/toe/content/people/poplawski.shtmTest, Beetsma, Roel2 http://www1.fee.uva.nl/toe/content/people/beetsma.shtmTest |
| المصدر: |
Journal of Macroeconomics. Mar2008, Vol. 30 Issue 1, p179-198. 20p. |
| مصطلحات موضوعية: |
*PUBLIC welfare, *BALANCE of trade, *INCOME inequality |
| الشركة/الكيان: |
H30 Inc. 176849370 |
| مستخلص: |
Abstract: This paper analyzes the incentives of a government facing electoral uncertainty to implement structural reforms in the presence of a deficit restriction. In designing a reform package, the government faces a trade-off between enhancing its electoral chances by providing compensation to private individuals and the cost of violating the deficit restriction. Ceteris paribus, tighter sanctions, more volatile macroeconomic shocks and lower income inequality worsen the trade-off. [Copyright &y& Elsevier] |
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| قاعدة البيانات: |
Business Source Index |
