The Non-Linear Relationship Between CEO Compensation Incentives And Corporate Tax Avoidance
| العنوان: | The Non-Linear Relationship Between CEO Compensation Incentives And Corporate Tax Avoidance |
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| المؤلفون: | Jae Eun Shin, Wooseok Choi, Seungmin Chee |
| المصدر: | Journal of Applied Business Research (JABR). 33:439-450 |
| بيانات النشر: | Clute Institute, 2017. |
| سنة النشر: | 2017 |
| مصطلحات موضوعية: | Labour economics, 050208 finance, Executive compensation, Compensation (psychology), 05 social sciences, ComputingMilieux_LEGALASPECTSOFCOMPUTING, 050201 accounting, Tax avoidance, Microeconomics, Incentive, 0502 economics and business, Economics, Incentive alignment, Business and International Management, Corporate tax |
| الوصف: | This study examines the effect of CEO compensation incentives on corporate tax avoidance. Unlike prior literature that assumes a monotonic relation between executive compensation incentives and tax avoidance, we find a non-linear relation between the two. Specifically, we find that CEO compensation incentives exhibit a positive relation with corporate tax avoidance at low levels of compensation incentives, whereas they show a negative relation at high levels of compensation incentives. We further find that the non-linear relationship between CEO compensation incentives and corporate tax avoidance does not exist for the subsample of S&P500 firms. Collectively, we provide evidence of the two counter effective forces, namely, - the incentive alignment effect and the risk-reducing effect, - that help explain the effect of CEO compensation incentives on tax avoidance. |
| تدمد: | 2157-8834 0892-7626 |
| الوصول الحر: | https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::0c68bcfc2e49149e6021adf7136b4cc0Test https://doi.org/10.19030/jabr.v33i3.9935Test |
| حقوق: | OPEN |
| رقم الانضمام: | edsair.doi...........0c68bcfc2e49149e6021adf7136b4cc0 |
| قاعدة البيانات: | OpenAIRE |
| تدمد: | 21578834 08927626 |
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