-
1تقرير
المؤلفون: Hanns Anton Gietl
مصطلحات موضوعية: info:eu-repo/classification/ddc
وصف الملف: application/pdf
العلاقة: https://mediatum.ub.tum.de/1486330Test; https://mediatum.ub.tum.de/doc/1486330/document.pdfTest
-
2تقرير
المؤلفون: Bosch-Rosa, Ciril, Gietl, Daniel, Heinemann, Frank
مصطلحات موضوعية:
Collaborative Research Center Transregio "Rationality and Competition", ddc:330 وصف الملف: application/pdf
العلاقة: Bosch-Rosa, Ciril; Gietl, Daniel; Heinemann, Frank (9. Dezember 2019): Risk-Taking under Limited Liability: Quantifying the Role of Motivated Beliefs. Collaborative Research Center Transregio 190, Discussion Paper No. 210 [PDF, 2MB]; https://epub.ub.uni-muenchen.de/70100/1/210.pdfTest; http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:bvb:19-epub-70100-0Test; https://epub.ub.uni-muenchen.de/70100Test/
الإتاحة: https://doi.org/10.5282/ubm/epub.70100Test
https://epub.ub.uni-muenchen.de/70100/1/210.pdfTest
https://epub.ub.uni-muenchen.de/70100Test/
http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:bvb:19-epub-70100-0Test -
3تقرير
المؤلفون: Bosch-Rosa, Ciril, Gietl, Daniel, Heinemann, Frank
الوصف: This paper investigates whether limited liability affects risk-taking through motivated beliefs. To do so, we run a within-subject experiment in which subjects invest in a risky asset under full or limited liability. In both cases, before the investment is made, subjects observe a noisy signal that indicates whether the investment will succeed or fail. They then state the likelihood of the investment's success and decide how much to invest. Our results show a strong effect of limited liability on both the investment decision and the formation of motivated beliefs. Compared to subjects under full liability, subjects under limited liability not only invest larger amounts but are also significantly more optimistic about the success of their investments. Finally, we show that more than one-third of the increase in investment under limited liability can be explained through motivated beliefs. ; limited liability; motivated beliefs; experiment
-
4تقرير
المؤلفون: Gietl, Daniel, Haufler, Andreas
الوصف: We analyze the competition in bonus taxation when banks compensate their managers by means of fixed and incentive pay and bankers are internationally mobile. Banks choose bonus payments that induce excessive managerial risk-taking to maximize their private benefits of existing government bailout guarantees. In this setting the international competition in bonus taxes may feature a \'race to the bottom\' or a \'race to the top\', depending on whether bankers are a source of net positive tax revenue or inflict net fiscal losses on taxpayers as a result of incentive pay. A \'race to the top\' becomes more likely when governments\' impose only lax capital requirements on banks, whereas a \'race to the bottom\' is more likely when bank losses are partly collectivized in a banking union. ; bonus taxes; international tax competition; migration
-
5تقرير
المؤلفون: Gietl, Daniel, Haufler, Andreas
الوصف: This paper analyzes the competition in bonus taxation when banks compensate their managers by means of incentive pay and bankers are internationally mobile. Bonus taxes make incentive pay more costly for national banks and lead to an outflow of managers, lower effort and less risk-taking in equilibrium. The international competition in bonus taxes may feature a `race to the bottom', or a `race to the top', depending on whether bankers exert a positive or a negative fiscal value on their home government. The latter can arise when governments bail out banks in the case of default, and bankers take excessive risks as a result of incentive pay.
-
6تقرير
المؤلفون: Daniel Gietl, Andreas Haufler
الوصف: We analyze the competition in bonus taxation when banks compensate their managers by means of fixed and incentive pay and bankers are internationally mobile. Banks choose bonus payments that induce excessive managerial risk-taking to maximize their private benefits of existing government bailout guarantees. In this setting the international competition in bonus taxes may feature a ‘race to the bottom’ or a ‘race to the top’, depending on whether bankers are a source of net positive tax revenue or inflict net fiscal losses on taxpayers as a result of incentive pay. A ‘race to the top’ becomes more likely when governments’ impose only lax capital requirements on banks, whereas a ‘race to the bottom’ is more likely when bank losses are partly collectivized in a banking union. ; bonus taxes, international tax competiton, migration
-
7تقرير
المؤلفون: Gietl, Daniel
الوصف: Empirical evidence suggests that managerial overconfidence and government guarantees contribute substantially to excessive risk-taking in the banking industry. This paper incorporates managerial overconfidence and limited bank liability into a principal-agent model, where the bank manager unobservably chooses effort and risk. An overconfident manager overestimates the returns to effort and risk. We find that managerial overconfidence necessitates an intervention into banker pay. This is due to the bank\'s exploitation of the manager\'s overvaluation of bonuses, which causes excessive risk-taking in equilibrium. Moreover, we show that the optimal bonus tax rises in overconfidence, if risk-shifting incentives are sufficiently large. Finally, the model indicates that overconfident managers are more likely to be found in banks with large government guarantees, low bonus taxes, and lax capital requirements. ; overconfidence; bailouts; banking regulation; bonus taxes
