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INTRODUCTIONThe essence of racial prejudice has not changed with time. It is the same today as it was in the 1980s and 1990s when Schuman and colleagues were composing Racial Attitudes in America (Schuman et al., 1997), and it is the same as it was in the 1950s when Gordon Allport (1954) was writing his seminal work, The Nature of Prejudice. Consequently, when survey research data tell one that prejudice is on the decline, it is tempting to feel a sense of optimism about the trajectory of race relations in this country. Unfortunately, the numbers can be a bit misleading (Hutchings, 2009; Neville et al., 2013). While the essence of prejudice has remained immutable over the years, the expression of it has evolved considerably (Bobo et al., 2009). Americans today are far less willing to admit to being prejudiced, even when their stated opinions clearly belie their race-neutral personas (Bonilla-Silva, 2003).Researchers have had to adapt to these changes in order to document how much prejudice still exists and how it influences people's thinking about race-conscious political issues. This can be tricky, but it is important because there are real consequences associated with prejudice, even when it is subtle and outwardly denied. Oftentimes, explicit measures do not fully appreciate this reality and underestimate the extent to which prejudice factors into policy attitudes. This leaves one with a far rosier picture of modern society than what is actually experienced on a day-to-day basis (Bonilla-Silva, 2001; Mercer et al., 2011, Sue, 2013).Of the myriad theories that have been proposed to describe contemporary expressions of prejudice, racial ideology theory (Bonilla-Silva, 1997) has emerged as one of the most promising. It alleges that people are motivated to protect the interests of the dominant racial group by advancing prejudicial views, but to do so in a manner that is perceived by others as non-offensive and nonaggressive (Bonilla-Silva, Lewis, & Embrick, 2004; Gushue & Constantine, 2007). A common strategy is to deny that there are genetic differences between the races ("I never said Whites are born smarter") while unashamedly embracing culture-blaming explanations for social stratification ("I just said that Black people don't work as hard because they know they'll get handouts anyway"). People are able to engage in this type of double-speak because cultural norms governing the expression of prejudice do not sanction people who state that Whites are more moral or have an impeccable work ethic in the same way that they sanction people who scream racial epithets. In fact, most listeners are willing to dismiss cultural explanations that favor Whites as little more than stating the obvious, especially when the speaker insists that racism is no longer a problem in today's society (Bonilla-Silva, 2012).Researchers have become increasingly aware of the role color-blindness plays in reasoning about race in therapeutic relationships, and they have begun conducting empirical research to bolster their theories. The most popular instrument for quantifying the trait is the use of the Color-Blind Racism Attitudes Scale (CoBRAS; Neville et al., 2000). Over a decade's worth of research has indicated that CoBRAS has solid psychometric properties, and the data it has produced have helped counselor educators to improve their trainees' cultural competencies (Neville et al., 2013; Neville, Spanierman, & Doan, 2006; Neville, Worthington, & Spanierman, 2001).Other research has explored the role of color-blindness in reasoning about political issues (Bonilla-Silva & Dietrich, 2011). For example, Oh and colleagues (2010) found CoBRAS to be a better predictor of affirmative action beliefs than race or group-interest. Similarly, Awad, Cokley, and Ravitch (2005) reported that CoBRAS scores were predictive of attitudes toward affirmative action, even after accounting for modern racism.PURPOSEThis study builds on previous research to demonstrate how CoBRAS can be used to advance educational and sociological inquiry. … |
