The Metaphysics of Free Will: A Critique of Free Won’t as Double Prevention
| العنوان: | The Metaphysics of Free Will: A Critique of Free Won’t as Double Prevention |
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| المؤلفون: | GRASSO, MATTEO |
| المساهمون: | Grasso, Matteo |
| المصدر: | Rivista Internazionale di Filosofia e Psicologia, Vol 6, Iss 1, Pp 120-129 (2015) |
| بيانات النشر: | Mimesis Edizioni, Milano, 2015. |
| سنة النشر: | 2015 |
| مصطلحات موضوعية: | Mental Causation, Metaphysic, Causation, Free Won’t, Double Prevention, lcsh:B, Free Will, Free Won't, Metaphysics, lcsh:Philosophy. Psychology. Religion |
| الوصف: | The problem of free will is deeply linked with the causal relevance of mental events. The caus-al exclusion argumentclaims that, in order to be causally relevant, mental events must be identical to phys-ical events. However, Gibb has recently criticized it,suggesting that mental events are causally relevant as double preventers. For Gibb, mental events enable physical effects to take place by preventing other men-tal events from preventing a behaviour to take place. The role of mental double preventers is hence simi-lar to what Libet names free won’t, namely the ability toveto an action initiated unconsciously by the brain. In this paper I will propose an argument against Gibb’s account, the causal irrelevance argument, showing that Gibb’s proposal doesnot overcome the objection of systematic overdetermination of causal relevance, because mental double preventers systematically overdetermine physical double preventers, and therefore mental events are causally irrelevant. |
| اللغة: | German |
| تدمد: | 2239-2629 2039-4667 |
| الوصول الحر: | https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=dedup_wf_001::2d73c7c279134e5d6ef34a2e99ab53e5Test http://www.rifp.it/ojs/index.php/rifp/article/view/rifp.2015.0009Test |
| حقوق: | OPEN |
| رقم الانضمام: | edsair.dedup.wf.001..2d73c7c279134e5d6ef34a2e99ab53e5 |
| قاعدة البيانات: | OpenAIRE |
| تدمد: | 22392629 20394667 |
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