دورية أكاديمية

Executive overconfidence and securities class actions

التفاصيل البيبلوغرافية
العنوان: Executive overconfidence and securities class actions
المؤلفون: BANERJEE, Suman, HUMPHERY-JENNER, Mark, NANDA, Vikram, THAM, T. Mandy
المصدر: Research Collection Lee Kong Chian School Of Business
بيانات النشر: Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University
سنة النشر: 2018
المجموعة: Institutional Knowledge (InK) at Singapore Management University
مصطلحات موضوعية: CEO Overconfidence, Team Overconfidence, Securities Class Actions, Governance, Finance, Finance and Financial Management
الوصف: Overconfident CEOs/senior executives tend to have excessively positive views of their own skills and their company’s future performance. We hypothesize that overconfident managers are more likely to engage in reckless or intentional actions/disclosures that give rise to securities class actions (SCAs). Empirical evidence is supportive: Overconfident CEOs/senior executives increase SCA likelihood, though litigation risk is ameliorated through improved governance, such as following the Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002. Post-SCA, companies are less likely to hire an overconfident CEO. Following an SCA, overconfident CEOs appear to moderate behavior and to reduce their litigation risk.
نوع الوثيقة: text
وصف الملف: application/pdf
اللغة: English
العلاقة: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/lkcsb_research/5979Test; https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/lkcsb_research/article/6978/viewcontent/SSRN_id2436264.pdfTest
DOI: 10.1017/S0022109018001291
الإتاحة: https://doi.org/10.1017/S0022109018001291Test
https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/lkcsb_research/5979Test
https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/lkcsb_research/article/6978/viewcontent/SSRN_id2436264.pdfTest
حقوق: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0Test/
رقم الانضمام: edsbas.E7C5070C
قاعدة البيانات: BASE