| الوصف: |
WE CONSIDER TWO problems in monetary and banking theory in this paper. The first of these deals with differences between monetary and tax-transfer resolutions of risk-sharing problems in overlapping-generations [12, 15] models of fiat money under uncertainty. Our second contribution-the scenario for which is also motivated in part by interventions needed for risk-sharing reasons-is an attempt to provide a rationale for interest-rate controls on the liabilities of intermediaries that invest in risky assets. Both models consider environments in which uncertainty exists, private markets are incomplete, and most importantly, some material payoff-relevant actions are not (perfectly) observable. The goal of this research is to provide further momentum to theoretical developments that serve to integrate information-based models of investment and intermediation with theories of unbacked fiat money, and the control of "monetary" institutions. In recent years, there has been a great deal of research interest in explicating the micro-economic foundations of fiat money (i.e., valued government-created assets which are unbacked by payoffs from productive investments or taxes), and the uniqueness and criteria for regulation of depository intermediary firms. Important contributions have been (among others) the works of Bryant [3], (the papers in) Kareken and Wallace [7], Fama [6], Merton [10], and Diamond and Dybvig [5]. Asymmetric-information based foundations of intermediary functioning have been provided by the papers of Leland and Pyle [9], followed by Diamond [4]. In most of this work, there has usually been a dichotomy between models that focus on providing and analyzing a role for fiat money, and those which analyze the rationale, regulation, and pricing of capital market intermediaries and their contracts. Regrettably, we persist in having this dichotomy in our work. Some recent work, like Fama [6], does merge these two aspects, however, by emphasizing perfect-information complete-market environments in which the financial structure irrelevance theorems of Modigliani and Miller [10] apply. Models of unbacked fiat money, many different types of which are to be found in Kareken and Wallace [7], can be usefully dichotomized as being of two types. In the first, fiat money serves the function of opening up or expanding trading opportunities among contemporaneously living agents, who have endowment |
