Bounding the inefficiency of outcomes in generalized second price auctions
| العنوان: | Bounding the inefficiency of outcomes in generalized second price auctions |
|---|---|
| المؤلفون: | Panagiotis Kanellopoulos, Maria Kyropoulou, Brendan Lucier, Renato Paes Leme, Éva Tardos, Christos Kaklamanis, Ioannis Caragiannis |
| المصدر: | Journal of Economic Theory. |
| سنة النشر: | 2014 |
| مصطلحات موضوعية: | FOS: Computer and information sciences, TheoryofComputation_MISCELLANEOUS, Computer Science::Computer Science and Game Theory, Economics and Econometrics, Generalized second-price auction, Auction theory, 05 social sciences, TheoryofComputation_GENERAL, 0102 computer and information sciences, Walrasian auction, 01 natural sciences, Revenue equivalence, Computer Science - Computer Science and Game Theory, 010201 computation theory & mathematics, 0502 economics and business, Economics, Vickrey auction, Price of anarchy, Vickrey–Clarke–Groves auction, 050207 economics, English auction, Mathematical economics, Computer Science and Game Theory (cs.GT) |
| الوصف: | The Generalized Second Price (GSP) auction is the primary auction used for monetizing the use of the Internet. It is well-known that truthtelling is not a dominant strategy in this auction and that inefficient equilibria can arise. In this paper we study the space of equilibria in GSP, and quantify the efficiency loss that can arise in equilibria under a wide range of sources of uncertainty, as well as in the full information setting. The traditional Bayesian game models uncertainty in the valuations (types) of the participants. The Generalized Second Price (GSP) auction gives rise to a further form of uncertainty: the selection of quality factors resulting in uncertainty about the behavior of the underlying ad allocation algorithm. The bounds we obtain apply to both forms of uncertainty, and are robust in the sense that they apply under various perturbations of the solution concept, extending to models with information asymmetries and bounded rationality in the form of learning strategies. We present a constant bound (2.927) on the factor of the efficiency loss (\emph{price of anarchy}) of the corresponding game for the Bayesian model of partial information about other participants and about ad quality factors. For the full information setting, we prove a surprisingly low upper bound of 1.282 on the price of anarchy over pure Nash equilibria, nearly matching a lower bound of 1.259 for the case of three advertisers. Further, we do not require that the system reaches equilibrium, and give similarly low bounds also on the quality degradation for any no-regret learning outcome. Our conclusion is that the number of advertisers in the auction has almost no impact on the price of anarchy, and that the efficiency of GSP is very robust with respect to the belief and rationality assumptions imposed on the participants. Comment: Accepted to JET (Journal of Economic Theory). A preliminary version of this paper appeared in arxiv with the title "On the efficiency of equilibria in generalized second price auctions". Conference versions of those results appeared in FOCS'10, EC'11 and EC'11 |
| تدمد: | 0022-0531 |
| الوصول الحر: | https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::7859f11b22cfb32a7da2d164eeeda619Test http://ora.ox.ac.uk/objects/uuid:58ef919a-ee72-49e9-ad15-f90ee52f6e8fTest |
| حقوق: | OPEN |
| رقم الانضمام: | edsair.doi.dedup.....7859f11b22cfb32a7da2d164eeeda619 |
| قاعدة البيانات: | OpenAIRE |
| تدمد: | 00220531 |
|---|