Licensing Decision
العنوان: | Licensing Decision |
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المؤلفون: | Toke Reichstein, Solon Moreira, Goretti Cabaleiro |
المصدر: | Industrial and Corporate Change. 28(4):773-792 |
بيانات النشر: | Oxford University Press, 2019. |
سنة النشر: | 2019 |
مصطلحات موضوعية: | Economics and Econometrics, Product market, 05 social sciences, Sample (statistics), Competition (economics), 0502 economics and business, Openness to experience, Revenue, Business, 050207 economics, Empirical evidence, License, 050203 business & management, Industrial organization, Sunk costs |
الوصف: | The fear of rent dissipation has been proposed as the main reason firms are hesitant to enter markets for technology. In this paper we investigate conditions under which firms are particularly reluctant to out-license their technologies due to shifts in the relative magnitudes between potential rent dissipation and revenue effects. Specifically, we offer theoretical arguments and empirical evidence suggesting that firms operating under higher product market competition are more reluctant to license their technologies. Firms’ openness to external knowledge, while having a direct positive association with greater licensing rates, also partially mitigates the negative effect of increasing product market competition. Exogenous sunk costs, however, increase firms’ reluctance to out-license and also further fuel the negative association between out-licensing and product market competition. The empirical investigation builds on a sample of 227 licensors involved in licensing contracts in the US pharmaceutical industry from 1986 to 2005. The study has substantial implications for management, research, and policymakers. |
اللغة: | English |
تدمد: | 1464-3650 0960-6491 |
الوصول الحر: | https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::eab26d70ea09887f585c54fc4747242aTest https://doi.org/10.1093/icc/dty036Test |
حقوق: | OPEN |
رقم الانضمام: | edsair.doi.dedup.....eab26d70ea09887f585c54fc4747242a |
قاعدة البيانات: | OpenAIRE |
تدمد: | 14643650 09606491 |
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