التفاصيل البيبلوغرافية
| العنوان: |
A New Formal Proof Model for RFID Location Privacy. |
| المؤلفون: |
Ha, JungHoon, Moon, SangJae, Zhou, Jianying, Ha, JaeCheol |
| المصدر: |
Computer Security - Esorics 2008; 2008, p267-281, 15p |
| مستخلص: |
The privacy and security problems in RFID systems have been extensively studied. However, less research has been done on formal analysis of RFID security. The existing adversarial models proposed in the literature have limitations for analyzing RFID location privacy. In this paper, we propose a new formal proof model based on random oracle and indistinguishability. It not only considers passive/active attacks to the message flows between RFID reader and tag, but also takes into account physical attacks for disclosing tag΄s internal state, thus making it more suitable for real RFID systems. We further apply our model to analyze location privacy of an existing RFID protocol. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR] |
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| قاعدة البيانات: |
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