تقرير
Selective Memory of a Psychological Agent
| العنوان: | Selective Memory of a Psychological Agent |
|---|---|
| المؤلفون: | Hagenbach, Jeanne, Koessler, Frédéric |
| المساهمون: | Institut d'Urbanisme de Paris (IUP), Paris School of Economics (PSE), École des Ponts ParisTech (ENPC)-École normale supérieure - Paris (ENS Paris), Université Paris sciences et lettres (PSL)-Université Paris sciences et lettres (PSL)-Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (UP1)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)-École des hautes études en sciences sociales (EHESS)-Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement (INRAE), Paris Jourdan Sciences Economiques (PJSE), Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (UP1)-École normale supérieure - Paris (ENS Paris), Université Paris sciences et lettres (PSL)-Université Paris sciences et lettres (PSL)-École des hautes études en sciences sociales (EHESS)-École des Ponts ParisTech (ENPC)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)-Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement (INRAE), ANR-17-EURE-0010,CHESS,Toulouse Graduate School défis en économie et sciences sociales quantitatives(2017), ANR-19-CE26-0010,StratCom,Diffusion de l'information en présence de rationalité limitée et de canaux de transmission complexes(2019) |
| المصدر: | Archive Ouverte d'INRAE ; 2021 |
| بيانات النشر: | HAL CCSD Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung (WZB) |
| مصطلحات موضوعية: | Anticipatory utility, Psychological games, Motivated beliefs, Selective memory, Imperfect recall, Disclosure games, Multi-self game, psy, lang |
| الوصف: | We consider a single psychological agent whose utility depends on his action, the state of the world, and the belief that he holds about that state. The agent is initially informed about the state and decides whether to memorize it, otherwise he has no recall. We model the memorization process by a multi-self game in which the privately informed first self voluntarily discloses information to the second self, who has identical preferences and acts upon the disclosed information. We identify broad categories of psychological utility functions for which there exists an equilibrium in which every state is voluntarily memorized. In contrast, if there are exogenous failures in the memorization process, then the agent memorizes states selectively. In this case, we characterize the partially informative equilibria for common classes of psychological utilities. If the material cost of forgetting is low, then the agent only memorizes good enough news. Otherwise, only extreme news are voluntarily memorized. |
| نوع الوثيقة: | report |
| اللغة: | English |
| العلاقة: | halshs-03151009; 10670/1.imlkbw; https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-03151009/file/WP_202111_.pdfTest; https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-03151009Test |
| الإتاحة: | https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-03151009/file/WP_202111_.pdfTest https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-03151009Test |
| حقوق: | other ; undefined |
| رقم الانضمام: | edsbas.DD881B62 |
| قاعدة البيانات: | BASE |
| الوصف غير متاح. |