دورية أكاديمية

Tax Evasion, Corruption and Market Entry

التفاصيل البيبلوغرافية
العنوان: Tax Evasion, Corruption and Market Entry
المؤلفون: Seidel, André, Thum, Marcel
حالة النشر: acceptedVersion
بيانات النشر: Wiley, 2016.
سنة النشر: 2016
المجموعة: Hochschulschriftenserver (HSSS) der SLUB Dresden
Original Material: urn:nbn:de:bsz:14-qucosa2-859847
مصطلحات موضوعية: Tax policy, Market entry, Corruption, Tax evasion, Enforcement, Steuerpolitik, Markteintritt, Korruption, Steuerhinterziehung, Besteuerung, info:eu-repo/classification/ddc/320, ddc:320, info:eu-repo/classification/ddc/330, ddc:330
الوصف: We analyze the impact of tax policy on the market entry of firms in the presence of corruption and tax evasion. In a world with corruption, firms must bribe corrupt officials to enter the market. For a given level of bribes, higher tax rates and stricter enforcement of taxation decrease tax evasion but typically reduce market entry. However, when the level of bribes reacts to tax policy, higher taxes and stricter enforcement of taxation can have a double benefit. Up to a certain threshold, for which we develop a simple rule, stricter enforcement increases market entry and reduces tax evasion.
Original Identifier: oai:qucosa:de:qucosa:85984
نوع الوثيقة: Article
اللغة: English
تدمد: 2662-8449
DOI: 10.1111/sjpe.12100
الإتاحة: https://tud.qucosa.de/id/qucosa%3A85984Test
https://tud.qucosa.de/api/qucosa%3A85984/attachment/ATT-0Test/
حقوق: info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
رقم الانضمام: edsndl.DRESDEN.oai.qucosa.de.qucosa.85984
قاعدة البيانات: Networked Digital Library of Theses & Dissertations
الوصف
تدمد:26628449
DOI:10.1111/sjpe.12100