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1تقرير
المؤلفون: Zhang, Junhao, Treyer, Valerie, Sun, Junfeng, Zhang, Chencheng, Gietl, Anton, Hock, Christoph, Razansky, Daniel, Nitsch, Roger M, Ni, Ruiqing
المصدر: Zhang, Junhao; Treyer, Valerie; Sun, Junfeng; Zhang, Chencheng; Gietl, Anton; Hock, Christoph; Razansky, Daniel; Nitsch, Roger M; Ni, Ruiqing (2023). Automatic analysis of skull thickness, scalp-to-cortex distance and association with age and sex in cognitively normal elderly. bioRxiv 524484, Cold Spring Harbor Laboratory.
مصطلحات موضوعية: Clinic for Nuclear Medicine, Institute for Regenerative Medicine (IREM), 610 Medicine & health
الوصف: Personalized neurostimulation has been a potential treatment for many brain diseases, which requires insights into brain/skull geometry. Here, we developed an open source efficient pipeline BrainCalculator for automatically computing the skull thickness map, scalp-to-cortex distance (SCD), and brain volume based on T $_{1}$ -weighted magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) data. We examined the influence of age and sex cross-sectionally in 407 cognitively normal older adults (71.9±8.0 years, 60.2% female) from the ADNI. We demonstrated the compatibility of our pipeline with commonly used preprocessing packages and found that BrainSuite Skullfinder was better suited for such automatic analysis compared to FSL Brain Extraction Tool 2 and SPM12- based unified segmentation using ground truth. We found that the sphenoid bone and temporal bone were thinnest among the skull regions in both females and males. There was no increase in regional minimum skull thickness with age except in the female sphenoid bone. No sex difference in minimum skull thickness or SCD was observed. Positive correlations between age and SCD were observed, faster in females (0.307%/y) than males (0.216%/y) in temporal SCD. A negative correlation was observed between age and whole brain volume computed based on brain surface (females -1.031%/y, males -0.998%/y). In conclusion, we developed an automatic pipeline for MR-based skull thickness map, SCD, and brain volume analysis and demonstrated the sex-dependent association between minimum regional skull thickness, SCD and brain volume with age. This pipeline might be useful for personalized neurostimulation planning.
وصف الملف: application/pdf
العلاقة: https://www.zora.uzh.ch/id/eprint/234646/1/ZORA234646.pdfTest; info:pmid/36711717; urn:issn:2164-7844
الإتاحة: https://doi.org/10.5167/uzh-23464610.1101/2023.01.19.524484Test
https://www.zora.uzh.ch/id/eprint/234646Test/
https://www.zora.uzh.ch/id/eprint/234646/1/ZORA234646.pdfTest -
2تقرير
المؤلفون: Bosch-Rosa, Ciril, Gietl, Daniel, Heinemann, Frank
الوصف: This paper investigates whether limited liability and moral hazard affect risk-taking through motivated beliefs. On the one hand, limited liability pushes investors towards taking excessive risks. On the other, such excesses make it hard for investors to maintain a positive self-image when moral hazard is present. Using a novel experimental design, we show that subjects form motivated beliefs to self-justify their excessive risk-taking. For the same investment opportunity, subjects invest more and are significantly more optimistic about the success of the investment if their failure can harm others. We show that more than one third of the investment increase under limited liability can be explained through motivated beliefs. Moreover, using a treatment with limited liability but no moral hazard, we show that motivated beliefs are formed subconsciously and can lead to the paradoxical result of investors taking larger risks when their investment can harm a third party than when it cannot. These results underscore the importance of motivated beliefs in regulatory policy as they show that one should target not only bad incentives but also “bad beliefs.”
العلاقة: Series: CESifo Working Paper; No. 9477; gbv-ppn:1782357580; http://hdl.handle.net/10419/249022Test; RePec:ces:ceswps:_9477
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3تقرير
المؤلفون: Bosch-Rosa, Ciril, Gietl, Daniel, Heinemann, Frank
مصطلحات موضوعية: ddc:330, C91, D84, G11, G41, Limited Liability, Motivated Beliefs, Experiment
الوصف: This paper investigates whether limited liability affects risk-taking through motivated beliefs. To do so, we run a within-subject experiment in which subjects invest in a risky asset under full or limited liability. In both cases, before the investment is made, subjects observe a noisy signal that indicates whether the investment will succeed or fail. They then state the likelihood of the investment's success and decide how much to invest. Our results show a strong effect of limited liability on both the investment decision and the formation of motivated beliefs. Compared to subjects under full liability, subjects under limited liability not only invest larger amounts but are also significantly more optimistic about the success of their investments. Finally, we show that more than one-third of the increase in investment under limited liability can be explained through motivated beliefs.
العلاقة: Series: Discussion Paper; No. 210; gbv-ppn:1686680023; http://hdl.handle.net/10419/222107Test
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4تقرير
المؤلفون: Hanns Anton Gietl
مصطلحات موضوعية: info:eu-repo/classification/ddc
وصف الملف: application/pdf
العلاقة: https://mediatum.ub.tum.de/1486330Test; https://mediatum.ub.tum.de/doc/1486330/document.pdfTest
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5تقرير
المؤلفون: Gietl, H.
وصف الملف: application/pdf
العلاقة: http://hdl.handle.net/21.11116/0000-0003-9737-5Test; http://hdl.handle.net/21.11116/0000-0003-9739-3Test
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6تقرير
المؤلفون: Gietl, Daniel
مصطلحات موضوعية: ddc:330, H20, H30, G28, G41, Overconfidence, Bailouts, Banking Regulation, Bonus Taxes
الوصف: Empirical evidence suggests that managerial overconfidence and government guarantees contribute substantially to excessive risk-taking in the banking industry. This paper incorporates managerial overconfidence and limited bank liability into a principal-agent model, where the bank manager unobservably chooses effort and risk. An overconfident manager overestimates the returns to effort and risk. We find that managerial overconfidence necessitates an intervention into banker pay. This is due to the bank's exploitation of the manager's overvaluation of bonuses, which causes excessive risk-taking in equilibrium. Moreover, we show that the optimal bonus tax rises in overconfidence, if risk-shifting incentives are sufficiently large. Finally, the model indicates that overconfident managers are more likely to be found in banks with large government guarantees, low bonus taxes, and lax capital requirements.
العلاقة: Series: Discussion Paper; No. 132; gbv-ppn:1066686564; http://hdl.handle.net/10419/194028Test; RePEc:rco:dpaper:132
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7تقرير
المؤلفون: Gietl, Daniel, Haufler, Andreas
مصطلحات موضوعية: ddc:330, H20, H87, G28, bonus taxes, international tax competition, migration
الوصف: We analyze the competition in bonus taxation when banks compensate their managers by means of fixed and incentive pay and bankers are internationally mobile. Banks choose bonus payments that induce excessive managerial risk-taking to maximize their private benefits of existing government bailout guarantees. In this setting the international competition in bonus taxes may feature a \'race to the bottom\' or a \'race to the top\', depending on whether bankers are a source of net positive tax revenue or inflict net fiscal losses on taxpayers as a result of incentive pay. A \'race to the top\' becomes more likely when governments\' impose only lax capital requirements on banks, whereas a \'race to the bottom\' is more likely when bank losses are partly collectivized in a banking union.
العلاقة: Series: Discussion Paper; No. 34; gbv-ppn:895137356; http://hdl.handle.net/10419/185704Test; RePEc:rco:dpaper:34
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8تقرير
المؤلفون: Gietl, Daniel, Haufler, Andreas
مصطلحات موضوعية: ddc:330, H20, H87, G28, bonus taxes, international tax competiton, migration
الوصف: We analyze the competition in bonus taxation when banks compensate their managers by means of fixed and incentive pay and bankers are internationally mobile. Banks choose bonus payments that induce excessive managerial risk-taking to maximize their private benefits of existing government bailout guarantees. In this setting the international competition in bonus taxes may feature a ‘race to the bottom’ or a ‘race to the top’, depending on whether bankers are a source of net positive tax revenue or inflict net fiscal losses on taxpayers as a result of incentive pay. A ‘race to the top’ becomes more likely when governments’ impose only lax capital requirements on banks, whereas a ‘race to the bottom’ is more likely when bank losses are partly collectivized in a banking union.
العلاقة: Series: CESifo Working Paper; No. 6495; gbv-ppn:88991642X; http://hdl.handle.net/10419/167481Test; RePec:ces:ceswps:_6495
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9تقرير
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10تقرير
المؤلفون: Roche, Jörg, Terrasi-Haufe, Elisabetta, Gietl, Kathrin, Simic, Mirjana
النص الكامل