دورية أكاديمية
A generalized Nash equilibrium problem arising in banking regulation: An existence result with Tarski's theorem
| العنوان: | A generalized Nash equilibrium problem arising in banking regulation: An existence result with Tarski's theorem |
|---|---|
| المؤلفون: | Braouezec, Yann, Kiani, Keyvan |
| المساهمون: | Lille économie management - UMR 9221 LEM, emlyon business school EM |
| بيانات النشر: | Elsevier |
| سنة النشر: | 2023 |
| المجموعة: | LillOA (Lille Open Archive - Université de Lille) |
| مصطلحات موضوعية: | Generalized games, Banking regulation, Cournot oligopoly, Asset sales, Tarski's fixed point theorem |
| الوصف: | When hit with an adverse shock, banks that do not comply with capital regulation sell risky assets to satisfy their solvency constraint. When financial markets are imperfectly competitive, this naturally gives rise to a GNEP. We consider a new framework with an arbitrary number of banks and assets, and show that Tarski's theorem can be used to prove the existence of a Nash equilibrium when markets are sufficiently competitive. We also prove the existence of ϵ-Nash equilibria. ; 51 ; 1 |
| نوع الوثيقة: | article in journal/newspaper |
| اللغة: | English |
| العلاقة: | Operations Research Letters; http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12210/79714Test |
| الإتاحة: | https://doi.org/20.500.12210/79714Test https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12210/79714Test |
| حقوق: | info:eu-repo/semantics/closedAccess |
| رقم الانضمام: | edsbas.63F52387 |
| قاعدة البيانات: | BASE |
| الوصف غير متاح. |