كتاب
Time Horizon and Cooperation in Continuous Time
| العنوان: | Time Horizon and Cooperation in Continuous Time |
|---|---|
| المؤلفون: | BIGONI, MARIA, CASARI, MARCO, A. Skrzypacz, G. Spagnolo |
| المساهمون: | M. Bigoni, M. Casari, A. Skrzypacz, G. Spagnolo |
| بيانات النشر: | Stanford Graduate School of Business USA STANFORD |
| سنة النشر: | 2011 |
| المجموعة: | IRIS Università degli Studi di Bologna (CRIS - Current Research Information System) |
| مصطلحات موضوعية: | FOLK THEOREM, PRISONER’S DILEMMA, BACKWARD INDUCTION, TERMINATION RULE, INFINITE HORIZON |
| الوصف: | When subjects interact in continuous time, their ability to cooperate may dramatically increase. In an experiment, we study the impact of different time horizons on cooperation in (quasi) continuous time prisoner's dilemmas. We find that cooperation levels are similar or higher when the horizon is deterministic rather than stochastic. Moreover, a deterministic duration generates different aggregate patterns and individual strategies than a stochastic one. For instance, under a deterministic horizon subjects show high initial cooperation and a strong end-of-period reversal to defection. Moreover, they do not learn to apply backward induction but to postpone defection closer to the end. |
| نوع الوثيقة: | book |
| وصف الملف: | ELETTRONICO |
| اللغة: | English |
| العلاقة: | firstpage:1; lastpage:41; numberofpages:41; http://hdl.handle.net/11585/131038Test |
| الإتاحة: | http://hdl.handle.net/11585/131038Test |
| رقم الانضمام: | edsbas.ACB1B94D |
| قاعدة البيانات: | BASE |
| الوصف غير متاح. |